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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most significant recent developments in Florida
law is the adoption of various amendments to the state constitu-
tion. In 1976, the electorate approved the "Sunshine Amendment"
to article II, calling for ethics in government.1 The voters adopted
two more amendments on March 11, 1980, modifying the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Florida under article V and increas-
ing the homestead exemption from ad valorem taxation under arti-
cle VII.2 This survey examines those amendments and discusses
governmental powers and duties, focusing on the three branches of
state government in the context of the separation of powers and
exploring the powers of local government. The discussion includes
1. For a discussion of the "Sunshine Amendment," see notes 372-90 and accompanying
text infra.
2. For a discussion and the text of the amendment to article V modifying supreme
court jurisdiction, see notes 70-156 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the
homestead exemption amendment under article VII, see notes 488-90 and accompanying
text infra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cases decided in the period from 1975 through the spring of 1980.
Individual rights under article I of the Florida Constitution lie
outside the scope of this survey.
II. THE JUDICIARY
A. The Courts
Article V, section 18 of the Florida Constitution vests the judi-
cial power in specified courts and prohibits the establishment of
any other courts. The vesting clause is an express grant of power to
the judiciary, while the establishment clause is an express limita-
tion on the legislature.4 The supreme court has interpreted the es-
tablishment clause to permit legislative creation of administrative
commissions functioning as judicial tribunals and panels function-
ing as evidence-gathering bodies.
In Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup,B the supreme court de-
termined that the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) was a ju-
dicial tribunal satisfying due process requirements in reviewing ad-
ministrative hearings on workers' compensation. The court reached
this determination by looking at the legislative intent in establish-
ing the IRC and at the qualifications of the Commission members.'
But the supreme court held that the IRC was not a court, for oth-
erwise its creation by the legislature would violate the establish-
ment clause of article V, section 1.7 The fine distinction between a
judicial tribunal for due process purposes and a court for establish-
ment clause purposes is difficult to grasp and may be difficult to
apply in other areas.8
3. The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal,
circuit courts and county courts. No other courts may be established by the
state, any political subdivision or any municipality. The legislature shall, by gen-
eral law, divide the state into appellate court districts and judicial circuits fol-
lowing county lines. Commissions established by law, or administrative officers
or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the
functions of their offices.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
4. See notes 231-68 and accompanying text infra.
5. 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
6. Id. at 170-71.
7. Although the legislature may grant quasi-judicial power to commissions and adminis-
trative bodies, it may establish no courts other than those specified in art. V, § 1. See note 3
supra.
8. The LeLoup opinion can be read broadly to mean that any administrative body
functioning as a court meets the requirements of due process and access to courts. It can
also be read more narrowly to mean that only those commissions whose members must meet
the qualifications for a circuit court judge are judicial tribunals. For analyses of the reach of
19801
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In Simmons v. Faust,9 the supreme court relied on the estab-
lishment clause to hold that a medical mediation panel'0 was not a
court. The decision of a circuit court judge, who had sat on the
panel as a judicial referee and passed on the constitutionality of a
statute, was therefore not an order of a trial court." Because the
panel had gathered evidence rather than determined legal rights, it
had not performed an essentially judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Simmons is consistent with LeLoup in that the court applied
the same threshold analysis; unless a body performs essential judi-
cial functions, the issue of whether it is a court or merely a judicial
tribunal is never reached." Both cases also effectively limited the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The Le-
Loup holding made review of the IRC exclusive but discretion-
ary,'" while the Simmons holding made review of a medical media-
tion panel available by common law certiorari in the proper
district court.'
4
The legislature may expand the judicial system by creating ad-
the LeLoup case, see Keyfetz, Workmen's Compensation, 1977 Developments in Florida
Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1333-34 (1978); Note, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 798 (1975).
The Florida Constitution employs the term "judicial tribunal" only in art. II, § 8(e), the
"Sunshine Amendment," which prohibits legislators from representing clients before state
agencies other than judicial tribunals. See notes 386-88 and accompanying text infra. For
purposes of that section, an agency is not a judicial tribunal unless it possesses four basic
judicial characteristics for predominantly all of its activities: adversary proceedings; an im-
partial group of decisionmakers; the power to issue and enforce final orders; and an identifi-
able standard of appellate review that tests for due process in the agency's decisional
processes. Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 931 (Fla. 1978).
9. 358 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 1978).
10. FLA. STAT. § 768.133(2) (1975). The act was recently declared unconstitutional in
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
11. Prior to the 1980 amendment of the constitution, the order of a trial court passing
on the validity of a statute evoked mandatory appellate review in the supreme court, but
the order of a commission did not. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1968) (amended 1980); see
notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
12. 358 So. 2d at 1359.
13. 307 So. 2d at 168. Discretionary jurisdiction would have been invoked upon a show-
ing that the IRC had departed from the essential requirements of the law, the standard
applied in interlocutory petitions and in common law certiorari. The jurisdictional point in
LeLoup is now merely academic, because the 1980 amendment eliminates supreme court
review of statewide agencies other than utilities commissions. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(2)
(as amended 1980). The legislature abolished the IRC, effective October 1, 1979, and pro-
vided for appellate review of workers' compensation agency decisions in the District Court
of Appeal, First District. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-312, § 1 (amending 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-40,
§ 46).
14. 358 So. 2d at 1359. See generally Brummer, Morris & Rosen, Extraordinary Writs:
A Powerful Tool for the Florida Practitioner, 1978 Developments in Florida Law, 33 U.
MIAMi L. Rav. 1045, 1060 (1979).
[Vol. 34:597
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ditional courts of the types listed in the vesting clause"5 without
violating the establishment clause, provided that the new courts
are created in accordance with article V, section 9.1e This section
authorizes the supreme court to determine whether the number of
judges or courts or both should be changed and to certify its find-
ings to the legislature, which may accept the certified plan in whole
or in part.1 7 The court recently certified a plan for the creation of
the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, 8 which the legislature
implemented in a modified form, raising a question of the interpre-
tation of section 9 for the first time. In an advisory opinion to the
governor,19 the supreme court ruled that the judiciary and the leg-
islature share the responsibility for creating new judicial positions
and for redefining old ones, with each branch performing specific
functions. The supreme court determines whether a need for
change exists, and its recommendations serve as outer limits on the
legislature. The legislative modifications of the 1979 proposal were,
in effect, an acceptance of a part of the plan certified by the
court.2 0
The powers of the judiciary are not limited to those expressed
in the constitution, but include "inherent" powers necessary to the
judicial function. In Rose v. Palm Beach County,2' the supreme
court defined as inherent "all powers reasonably required to enable
a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its
dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist
because the court exists . .. ,"2 The court held in Rose that in a
case involving a criminal defendant's fundamental right to a fair
trial, the judiciary may use its inherent power to compel a county
15. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1; see note 3 supra.
16. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 9.
17. The legislature may go beyond the certified plani to provide for a greater increase or
decrease than proposed only upon the vote of a two-thirds majority. Id.
18. The plan suggested a redefinition of appellate districts and the creation of a new
district court of appeal. The supreme court also discerned a need for ten circuit court judge-
ships, seven county court judgeships, and ten district appellate court judgeships. In re Advi-
sory Opinion to Governor, Request of June 29, 1979, 374 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1979).
19. Id. Three of the justices doubted whether the court should have exercised its discre-
tionary jurisdiction, absent an adversarial context. Id. at 969-72; see notes 281-90 and ac-
companying text infra.
20. 374 So. 2d at 964-65. Although the increased number of judgeships beyond those
recommended was not an acceptance "in part," it was nevertheless permissible because ap-
proved by a two-thirds majority of the legislature. See note 17 supra.
21. 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
22. Id. at 136 n.3 (quoting CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 2 (1973)).
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to make travel payments to defense witnesses in amounts greater
than those set by statute.2 3 Paradoxically, the court invoked the
separation of powers doctrine' 4 to justify this intrusion into the
legislative power, noting that the judiciary cannot allow those who
hold the purse strings to use financial pressure to control a coequal
branch of government.' The judiciary is particularly sensitive to
such pressure because one of its inherent functions is to protect
individuals aggrieved by official actions of the other two branches.
However justified the court may have been on these particular
facts, the decision has disturbing implications. The expenditure of
funds by the judiciary could upset the political balance achieved in
the fiscal policy set by the legislature pursuant to its constitutional
responsibilities.
B. Rulemaking
Article V, section 2(a)2e of the Florida Constitution provides
that the supreme court shall be the exclusive rulemaker for prac-
tice and procedure in all courts. The legislature may repeal the
rules adopted, but has no power to enact procedural rules.'7 The
power of the court is exclusive to the extent that a rule is purely
procedural," while the legislative power embraces enactments of
substantive law. If the legislature enacts a statute affecting the
procedure in a court, the validity of the statute turns on whether it
prescribes a right or duty and is, consequently, an enactment of
23. FLA. STAT. § 90.14 (1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 92.142 (1979)). The court
also held that the right of an accused to compulsory process against witnesses is a funda-
mental right. 361 So. 2d at 137 n.4.
24. See notes 339-54 and accompanying text infra.
25. 361 So. 2d at 137 n.6.
26. The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative super-
vision of all courts, the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceed-
ing when the jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked, and
a requirement that no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has
been sought. These rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds
vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
27. See In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla.
1973).
28. "Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, method,
mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress
for their invasion. 'Practice and procedure' may be described as the machinery of the judi-
cial process as opposed to the product thereof." In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,




In a series of three tort cases dealing with the joinder of insur-
ance companies, the supreme court established that unless the leg-
islature is clearly granting or withholding a substantive right, an
attempt to control by statute the point at which the insurer for-
mally enters the lawsuit will be considered a procedural enactment
unconstitutionally encroaching on the rulemaking authority of the
court.80 In Carter v. Sparkman,s1 a malpractice suit against both
the treating physician and his insurer, the physician moved to dis-
miss on the basis that the Medical Malpractice Reform Act8" re-
quired mediation of such claims prior to trial on the merits. The
plaintiff attacked the provision of the Act proscribing reference at
trial to insurance coverage or joinder of an insurer," on the basis
that the legislature had unconstitutionally enacted a rule of proce-
dure. The court agreed, keying on the statutory term "reference,"
and decided that references made during a trial are a purely proce-
dural matter concerning the conduct of proceedings.8 The court
recognized the wisdom of the legislative policy 5 and adopted the
statute as a rule of procedure."6
School Board v. Price8 7 involved a challenge to a statute which
waived the sovereign immunity of a school board as a political sub-
29. See notes 339-46 and accompanying text infra.
30. The three decisions leave open the questions of whether the legislature may effect a
total prohibition of joinder of the insurer which would result in dual trials, and whether the
legislature may control the timing of joinder in a single lawsuit where the applicable statute
evinces a clear intent to change existing substantive rights in actions not involving sovereign
immunity.
31. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
32. FLA. STAT. § 768.133 (1975) (recodified at FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (1979)). Section
768.44, which establishes the medical liability mediation panels, was recently declared un-
constitutional in Aladana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
33. FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1). The plaintiff also attacked the mediation requirement as an
infringement of equal protection, due process, and access to courts. The court held that
although the legislation reached the outer limits of constitutional tolerance in the burden
placed on plaintiffs, it did not overstep those bounds. 335 So. 2d at 806.
34. 335 So. 2d at 806. The court may have overlooked the substantive effect of insur-
ance coverage on jury determinations. If the legislature was concerned that a jury would be
more inclined to find liability if it knew the defendant was insured, then the statute with-
holding such information would affect the substantive right of the plaintiff by decreasing
the likelihood of recovery. Under such a rationale, the statute was more than a mere proce-
dural tool. See Lee & Mussetto, Insurance, 1979 Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 765, 767-69 (1980).
35. The legislative policy was to stem the rising cost of malpractice insurance and ulti-
mately benefit the consumer through increased availability of medical services at lower cost.
335 So. 2d at 806.
36. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e).
37. 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978).
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division and included the following proscription: "[N]o attempt
shall be made in the trial of any action against a school board to
suggest the existence of any insurance . .3.8."8 Relying on the
Carter decision, the district court found this proscription unconsti-
tutional.3 9 The supreme court reversed, distinguishing Carter be-
cause in the present case the legislature had granted injured plain-
tiffs a right to sue which otherwise would have been barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The insurance proscription was
part and parcel of the substantive right as a condition to its exer-
cise and, therefore, was within the legislative sphere. 0
The third case in the series, Markert v. Johnston,1 concerned
a statute which disallowed joinder of the insurer in motor vehicle
liability suits in one section, but in another section allowed joinder
after the verdict was rendered.4 2 The court struck down the statute
because its plain language evinced a legislative intent to control
only the timing of the joinder, merely a procedural step in the con-
duct of a single suit.'" The court pointed out that the statute did
not change the substantive right of direct action against an insurer,
which the court had previously conferred" in recognition that the
insurer is the real party in interest. Rather than changing the pol-
icy of that prior decision, the statute had merely specified the pre-
cise moment when the real party in interest would be recognized.
As a timing mechanism, it was procedural rather than substantive
and unconstitutionally encroached on the rulemaking authority of
the court.
An attempt by the legislature to confer standing on a condo-
minium association to bring a class action on behalf of its member-
ship was also held to be an impermissible legislative crossing of the
38. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(2) (1979).
39. 342 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
40. The court expressly limited to its facts a prior contrary decision, School Bd. v. Sur-
rette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973) (striking down a substantially equivalent statute). 362 So.
2d at 1340.
41. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
42. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977) (declared unconstitutional in Markert v. Johnston, 367
So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1978)).
43. The legislative intent was apparently the same as that behind the statute struck
down in Carter-to keep insurance information from the jury. Although the legislature
could not proscribe "reference" to the insurer after Carter, the non-joinder statute would
effect the same result. Unlike Carter, however, the Markert decision did not adopt the
stricken statute as a rule of procedure. See 367 So. 2d at 1006 (Alderman, J., concurring
specially).
44. See Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). For an interesting contrary




line between substance and procedure in Avila South Condomin-
ium Association v. Kappa Corp.45 The supreme court defined sub-
stantive law as "those rules and principles which fix and declare
the primary rights of individuals as respects their persons and
their property."' "6 The court viewed standing to sue not as a sub-
stantive right, but as a procedural means of getting the parties
through the judicial process. Because the challenged statute47 pro-
vided a practical means of resolving in a single suit the problems of
common interest to unit owners, however, the court adopted the
statute as a rule of procedure. 8
In Duval County School Board v. Florida Public Employees
Relations Commission,4 9 the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, resolved a conflict between a rule 50 providing for an auto-
matic stay of the effect of an administrative order under judicial
review, and a statute' providing that judicial review would not
stay the effect of unfair labor practice orders of the Public Em-
ployees Relations Commission (PERC). The court held the rule in-
applicable to PERC administrative hearings charging a school
board with unfair labor practices," because the rule "was not writ-
ten in contemplation that an administrative order of one State
agency aggrieving another would one day be reviewable by petition
for certiorari. ' 5 3 This result is contrary to the general rule that if a
statute and a rule of court conflict with respect to matters of judi-
cial procedure, the rule prevails.'4 The court did not address the
issue of whether the statute was itself a procedural rule and there-
45. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
46. Id. at 608. The court adopted its definition from a 1941 federal case, Kellman v.
Stolz, 1 F.R.D. 726 (N.D. Iowa 1941). See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So.
2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring).
47. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (Supp. 1976) (declared unconstitutional in Avila S. Condo.
Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1976)).
48. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b) (effective June 13, 1977). Although adoption of the rule
makes the point moot, it is arguable that the substantive/procedural line was improperly
drawn. Defects in individual units will often be too small for one person to seek judicial aid.
Thus, by permitting the aggregation of claims through class action, the legislature granted a
substantive right of access to courts.
49. 346 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
50. FLA. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(2).
51. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(3), 447.503 (1975) (amended 1979).
52. Application of the rule in this situation would have relieved the school board of its
duty to bargain in good faith while the order was being judiciallyreviewed.
53. 346 So. 2d at 1088. A broad reading of the decision would support a challenge to
any rule in conflict with a statute where the rule was established prior to a new mode of
administrative procedure, using the argument that the rule did not contemplate this mode.
54. See Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974).
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fore unconstitutional."
Statutes that affect judicial access to information have been
held constitutionally infirm as procedural rules. In Gator Freight-
ways, Inc. v. Mayo," the court held that a statute regulating ad-
ministrative procedures of the Public Service Commission imper-
missibly determined which hearing records would be released to
the court as part of the record on appeal. Determining the rele-
vancy of evidence is a judicial rather than a legislative function.
While Gator Freightways invalidated an attempt to withhold in-
formation from the judiciary, Johnson v. State57 invalidated an at-
tempt to impose information on the judiciary. In that case, the
court invalidated a statute requiring a presentence investigation in
felony cases, which conflicted with a rule of procedure permitting
sentencing without investigation under specified circumstances.5
The court reasoned that in adopting the rule, it had already deter-
mined that the matter was procedural; therefore, the statute was
unconstitutional.5
9
Similarly, the court protected its access to information after a
case has been decided, even when that access is subject to legisla-
tive regulation. In Johnson v. State,e0 the trial court denied a de-
fendant's request to expunge the record of his arrest as provided
by a statute" that the court found unconstitutional.6 2 The su-
55. The statute determines when a stay will be automatic and when it will not, arguably
an impermissible interference with the machinery of the court.
56. 328 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1976).
57. 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), aff'd, 346 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1977); see notes 343-46
and accompanying text infra.
58. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.710.
59. Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975), in which the court upheld a
statute directly conflicting with a rule, seems to contradict this analysis. Under Johnson, the
existence of a rule would presuppose a determination that the area was procedural, an ar-
guably circular approach. The statute upheld in Benyard provided that criminal sentences
for offenses not charged in the same indictment must be served consecutively unless the
court directs otherwise. FLA. STAT. § 921.16 (1973) (amended 1979). FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.722
provided that sentences are concurrent unless the court directs otherwise. The court recog-
nized that whether a sentence is concurrent or consecutive directly affects the length of time
served and is therefore substantive. The court applied the statute retroactively to further
the policy of uniformity in sentencing.
Whenever possible the court will read a statute in harmony with a rule. In Swan v.
State, 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975), the court considered FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1979), which
provided that any relevant evidence may be presented to the court before sentencing in a
capital case. The defendant contended that the statute repealed or amended FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.710, which permitted a presentence investigation. The court held that the two were in
harmony, both permitting a presentence investigation at the discretion of the court. The
legislature could not amend a rule of court, and the court would not imply repeal.
60. 336 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1976).
61. FLA. STAT. § 901.33 (1975) (declared unconstitutional in Johnson v. State, 336 So.
[Vol. 34:597
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preme court held that the legislature had created a substantive
right of expungement for certain persons, but that in dictating the
manner in which the record would be expunged, it had infringed
on the court's rulemaking power. The court declared that the
proper procedure would be to seal the record, permitting access
under judicial supervision."
When the legislature enacted the new Florida Evidence
Code," the court foresaw similar constitutional challenges to por-
tions of the Code as legislatively promulgated rules of practice and
procedure. To forestall such litigation and the resulting confusion
in applying the Evidence Code, the court temporarily adopted the
Code's provisions to the extent they were procedural, under the
rulemaking power of article V, section 2(a). 65
The supreme court invoked its rulemaking power in 1978 to
take jurisdiction of Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh,6" a suit to enjoin a
stenographer from the unauthorized practice of law.6 7 The court
adopted rules in this case to set the parameters within which a
layman could provide information to other laymen regarding ac-
cess to the judicial system in civil matters such as divorces, wills,
and bankruptcies.68 The court narrowly defined its regulations so
2d 93 (Fla. 1976)).
62. The trial court based its analysis on the inherent power and duty of the court to
keep records of its proceedings, noting the possible need for the records in determining
rights of people in the future. 336 So. 2d at 94.
63. This decision garnered a majority of only four to three, possibly because the strick-
en statute granted a new right which included destruction of the record. The dissent argued
that the statute only minimally interfered with a ministerial function of the court and was
permissible. Id. at 96 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
64. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, as amended by 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-77, 77-174 & 1978
Fla. Laws ch. 78-361 (effective July 1, 1979).
65. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979). The court invited the
legal community to file specific objections and suggestions regarding the new rules during
this temporary transitional stage.
66. 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
67. Ms. Brumbaugh's case did not fall within the art. V, § 15 grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to admit persons to the practice of law and to discipline those admitted because she
neither sought nor had been granted admission. But see Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d
378 (Fla. 1979). Similarly, because this was an original case, it did not fall within the art. V,
§ 3 grant of appellate jurisdiction. The case represents an interesting, indeed unusual,
means by which the court acquired subject matter jurisdiction. The authors know of only
one other instance in which the jurisdiction of the supreme court arguably had been invoked
by litigants pursuant to art. V, § 2(a). See State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974). But see State v. Lyons, 293 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
68. The court outlined the following parameters:
Ms. Brumbaugh, and others in similar situations, may sell printed material pur-
porting to explain legal practice and procedure to the public in general and she
may sell sample legal forms ..... Further, we hold that it is not improper for
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as not to place unnecessary restrictions on the civil rights of the
persons affected, the first amendment rights to speak and print
what one chooses, the right of self-representation, the right of pri-
vacy, and the right of access to courts.
Section 2(a) also provides that the supreme court shall make
rules for the transfer of any proceeding to the court having proper
jurisdiction when the jurisdiction of another court has been im-
providently invoked. This mandate has been narrowly construed to
mean that the appellant who timely files notice of appeal in the
correct lower court, but invokes the jurisdiction of the wrong ap-
pellate court, may have his case transferred to the correct appel-
late court. On the other hand, the appellant who timely files a no-
tice of appeal in the wrong court will have failed to take a step
essential to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court, which will
thus be without power to transfer the case.6 9
C. Supreme Court Jurisdiction
On March 11, 1980, the Florida electorate adopted a constitu-
tional amendment altering the jurisdiction of the supreme court
and the district courts of appeal. Although future litigation will be
necessary to determine the precise limits of the modified jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court, the plain language of the amendment
offers some guidance to its probable interpretation by the court:
(b) JURISDICTION-The supreme court:
(1) Shall hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts
Marilyn Brumbaugh to engage in a secretarial service, typing such forms for her
clients, provided that she only copy the information given to her in writing by
her clients. In addition, Ms. Brumbaugh may advertise her business activities of
providing secretarial and notary services and selling legal forms and general
printed information. However, Marilyn Brumbaugh must not, in conjunction
with her business, engage in advising clients as to the various remedies available
to them, or otherwise assist them in preparing those forms necessary for a disso-
lution proceeding. More specifically, Marilyn Brumbaugh may not make inquires
nor answer questions from her clients as to the particular forms which might be
necessary, how best to fill out such forms, where to properly file such forms, and
how to present necessary evidence at the court hearings. Our specific holding
with regard to the dissolution of marriage also applies to other unauthorizea
legal assistance such as the preparation of wills or real estate transaction docu-
ments. While Marilyn Brumbaugh may legally sell forms in these areas, and type
up instruments which have been completed by clients, she must not engage in
personal legal assistance in conjunction with her business activities, including
the correction of errors and omissions.
355 So. 2d at 1194.
69. Southeast First Nat'l Bank v. Herin, 357 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1978). See also Adminis-
trative Order, 374 So. 2d 972, 973 (Fla. 1979).
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imposing the death penalty and from order s of ft1 ia courts and
decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state
statute or a provision of the state constitution. initially -nd-di-
mtly pmaig the v alidity of a state statute o. a federal tatut
or t. eat, o t, JoLstr uing a viaofl of the state 0. fede.al
constitution.
(2) When provided by general law, shall hear appeals from
final judgments and o.de. of t.ial courts imposing life i .p
onment o. final judgmen entered in proceedings for the valida-
tion of bonds or certificates of indebtedness and shall review
action of statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utili-
ties providing electric, gas, or telephone service.
(3) May review by-certioari any decision of a district
court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state statute, or
that expressly construes a provision of the state or federal con-
stitution, or that expressly affects a class of constitutional or
state officers, that passes upon a question -ertfied l, a di.-t
.ourt of appeal to be of great public inter.et, or that expressly
and directly conflicts that is . n direct onfic with a decision of
another any district court of appeal or of the supreme court on
the same question of law, and an, .nteo..tot, o..de. passing
upon a matte.. which upon finvd judgment would be directly app
pealable to the supreme cottit and may issue wtits ofcrtoJ
jurisdietion.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal
that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public
importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with
a decision of another district court of appeal.
(5) May review any order or judgment of a trial court cer-
tified by the district court of appeal in which an appeal is
pending to be of great public importance, or to have a great
effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the
state, and certified to require immediate resolution by the su-
preme court.
(6) May review a question of law certified by the Supreme
Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals
which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no
controlling precedent of the supreme court of Florida.
(7) (f4- May issue writs of prohibition to courts-and-corn-
Musesa.w~ within the jurisdietion of the supeme cout
to-review and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its
jurisdiction.
(8) f&) May issue writs of mandamus and quo warranto to
state officers and state agencies.
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(9) (6) May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas
corpus returnable before the supreme court or any justice, a dis-
trict court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit judge.
(7) Shall have the~ poe of di et reie of adiistiative
action .....ibed y Lg l-a. 70
1. APPEAL OF RIGHT
The amendment does not change the mandatory jurisdiction
of the supreme court to hear appeals from final judgments of trial
courts imposing the death penalty.Y Similarly unchanged is the
appeal of right, when provided by general law, from final judg-
ments of trial courts entered in proceedings for the validation of
bonds or certificates of indebtedness. 72 On the other hand, the
amendment eliminates direct appeal to the supreme court, when
provided by general law, or orders of trial courts imposing life
imprisonment."
8
The amendment makes major reductions in appeals of right to
the supreme court from orders and decisions "initially and directly
passing on the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or
treaty, or construing a provision of the state or federal constitu-
tion."117 Trial court orders of this kind are no longer appealable di-
rectly to the supreme court." Orders of the circuit court acting as
a trial court are appealed to the appropriate district court.76 Dis-
trict court decisions declaring invalid a state statute or a provision
of the state constitution remain appealable by right to the supreme
court.77 In contrast, review of district court decisions expressly de-
claring a state statute valid or expressly construing a provision of
70. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b) (as amended 1980). Words in shrack truagh type are
deletions from existing law; words in underscored italic type are additions.
71. Id. § 3(b)(1).
72. Id. § 3(b)(2).
73. Id. (1968). Because no enabling legislation was ever enacted under this former pro-
vision, the amendment made no practical reduction in jurisdiction of appeals of life
sentences.
74. Id. § 3(b)(1) (1968).
75. Id. (as amended 1980). This change reduces the opportunity for attorneys to raise a
statutory challenge in order to ensure direct appeal to the supreme court from a trial court.
76. See notes 197-200 and accompanying text infra.
77. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (as amended 1980). It should be noted that the amend-
ment virtually eliminates supreme court review of county court orders which pass upon the
validity of statutes or constitutional provisions. Final appellate review of such orders typi-
cally lies in the circuit courts, from which supreme court review is unavailable. See England,
Hunter & Williams, An Analysis of the 1980 Jurisdictional Amendment, 54 FLA. B.J. 406,
409 (1980); notes 226-27 and accompanying text infra.
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the state or federal constitution is now within the discretionary ju-
risdiction of the supreme court. 8 This dichotomy indicates that
the supreme court will be primarily concerned with decisions that
disrupt legislative enactments and consistency of statutory inter-
pretation throughout the state.7
The restriction of appeal of right to cases in which the district
court declares invalid a state statute or constitutional provision
raises the issue of the vitality of the "inherency doctrine."80 Under
this judicially created doctrine, the failure of a lower court to rule
explicitly on the validity of a statute would not prevent the su-
preme court from assuming jurisdiction under former section
3(b)(1). If a decision on the validity of the statute was necessary to
a determination of the cause, the supreme court would base its ju-
risdiction on the lower court's having "inherently" passed on the
statute's validity. Just as an appeal of right to the supreme court
could be raised by an inherent "initial and direct passing" on stat-
utory validity before the amendment, an appeal could now be
raised by an inherent "declaration of statutory invalidity."
81
78. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980); see notes 90-92 and accompanying
text infra.
Decisions involving federal statutes, formerly appealable of right, are mentioned no-
where in amended § 3(b). Presumably, review would be available if the decision qualified for
discretionary certification jurisdiction. See note 156 and accompanying text infra.
79. It is arguable, however, that district court decisions upholding a statute are more
likely to be in derogation of individual rights than decisions invalidating a statute. To the
extent that appeal of right to the supreme court is available only for the latter, those indi-
vidual rights may have been subordinated to an institutional concern for precedential con-
sistency in statutory interpretation.
On the other hand, litigants in either case will have had their appeal as of right in the
district court of appeal. Further review by the supreme court in its supervisory role may be
compelling only where the impact of a statutory invalidation reaches beyond the immediate
litigants.
80. See Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1978); Demko's Gold Coast Trailer Park,
Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 218 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 1969); Harrell's Candy Kitchen v.
Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1959).
81. The argument for continued application of the inherency doctrine is persuasive be-
cause in areas in which the framers of the amendment wanted an explicit statement, they
added the word "expressly." See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980); FLA. R.
App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(ii) (as amended 1980) and accompanying committee notes, promul-
gated in In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370,
1371 (Fla. 1980); England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 77, at 409. Furthermore, the
grant of a right of appeal instead of discretionary appeal indicates that the framers intended
to encourage review in the area of statutory invalidity. In any event, the potential confusion
and inconsistency, engendered by the perception that a particular statute is invalid in only
one district, would warrant supreme court review.
On the other hand, it is arguable that a narrow reading of "declaring" to require an
explicit statement of invalidity would be more consistent with the general tenor of the
amendment, which curtails supreme court jurisdiction.
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The amendment eliminates the power of direct review of ad-
ministrative action prescribed by general law,82 but provides for
mandatory direct review, pursuant to enabling legislation, of ac-
tions of "statewide agencies relating to rates or service of utilities
providing electric, gas, or telephone service."' s Under the former
provision, the supreme court announced in Smith Terminal Ware-
house Co. v. Bevis 4 that its function in reviewing a decision of an
administrative body is to determine if the decision departs from
the essential requirements of law and if the agency based its con-
clusions on substantial, competent evidence. Whether this stand-
ard will apply to review of the Public Service Commission under
the new section 3(b)(2) is uncertain.
2. DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 3(B)(3)
The words "by certiorari" have been stricken from section
3(b)(3), thereby abolishing constitutional certiorari jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court of Florida.8 The new provision retains discre-
tionary review of decisional conflict and creates discretionary re-
view in some areas formerly reviewed by direct appeal.8"
The word "expressly" is a conspicuous addition to the section.
In the past, the justices of the supreme court have voiced their
concern with the unnecessary expenditure of judicial energies
needed to search a record for evidence that the jurisdiction of the
court was properly invoked.87 The amendment apparently requires
a written opinion in which the jurisdictional basis for review is evi-
dent.88 Such a requirement shifts from the supreme court to the
district courts of appeal the ultimate responsibility of screening
district court decisions for review. This shift creates an opportu-
nity for district courts to shelter their decisions from review by
82. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7) (1968).
83. Id. § 3(b)(2) (as amended 1980). This section apparently applies only to the Public
Service Commission.
84. 312 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1975).
85. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980); see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2) (as
amended 1980) and accompanying committee notes, promulgated in In re Emergency
Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 1980).
86. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980); see note 70 and accompanying text
supra.
87. E.g., Address by the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, University of Miami
School of Law (Feb. 25, 1980).
88. If the opinion of the district court must expressly state the basis of jurisdiction, the
amendment has apparently changed the focus of review from the decision of the district




issuing a per curiam affirmance or reversal, or by carefully drafting
an opinion that avoids expressing a potential jurisdictional basis.e9
a. Decisions Expressly Declaring Valid a State Statute
The Supreme Court of Florida "[mlay review any decision of a
district court of appeal that expressly declares valid a state stat-
ute."90 Express validation will require not only a written opinion
but also an explicit statement upholding the statute in that opin-
ion. The amendment removes decisions validating a state statute
from the mandatory jurisdiction of the supreme court 1 and adds
the word "expressly" to modify "declare." These changes indicate
that the framers of the amendment considered this category of de-
cisions in less urgent need of immediate supreme court review. For
this reason, the inherency doctrine will no longer be applied to find
validation."s
b. Decisions Expressly Construing the State or
Federal Constitution
In order to "construe" a constitution for purposes of establish-
ing appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court under the 1968 con-
stitution, 9 a lower court had to "explain, define or otherwise elimi-
nate existing doubts arising from the language or terms of the
constitutional provision" in question. Had this standard been en-
forced strictly, the insertion of the word "expressly" in the
amended section 5 would add unnecessary surplusage, creating no
change in the previous law of constitutional construction. But, in
Potwin v. Keller," the supreme c6urt found a "construction" of
the Constitution of the United States in a district court per curiam
89. The authors do not suggest that district courts are anxious to foreclose review of
their decisions, but that an opportunity is now available which did not exist before the
change. The supreme court may have the opportunity to counteract any abuse by interpret-
ing the word "expressly" to include per curiam opinions citing other cases as part of the
decision. See notes 124-29 and accompanying text infra. But see England, Hunter & Wil-
liams, supra note 77, at 411.
90. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980).
91. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
92. For a discussion of the inherency doctrine, see notes 80-81 and accompanying text
supra.
93. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1968).
94. Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 1958).
95. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980) provides that the supreme court
"[m]ay review any decision of a district court of appeal ... that expressly construes a pro-
vision of the state or federal constitution." See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
96. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975).
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opinion that cited cases but made no analysis.0 Although the cases
cited had construed the Constitution, the district court opinion did
not explain the meaning of the provisions, but simply applied the
previously established case law to the facts before the court. The
continued vitality of Potwin is doubtful, in view of the new re-
quirement that constitutional constructions be express."
c. Decisions Expressly Affecting a Class of
Constitutional or State Officers
Section 3(b)(3) as amended preserves discretionary supreme
court jurisdiction of any district court decision that "expressly af-
fects a class of constitutional or state officers." 99 The addition of
the word "expressly" connotes that the district court must at least
have written an opinion, but whether that opinion must state that
the rule of the case affects a class of officers is not clear. As Justice
England noted in Shevin v. Cenville Communities, Inc.,100 this
form of review has been narrowly construed "to stem the erosion of
finality in the district courts" 101 and will not ordinarily arise if the
decision below affects only one agency of the state.1 02 On the other
hand, in Taylor v. Tampa Electric Co.,108 the supreme court heard
an appeal from a district court decision that interpreted an
amended state statute10 4 to permit clerks of the circuit courts to
exact a commission on certain disbursements to defendants in emi-
nent domain proceedings. The court accepted jurisdiction because
the constitution establishes the office of circuit court clerk1 5 and
because the decision affected the clerks as a class.
d. Decisions Expressly and Directly in Conflict
The purpose of discretionary conflict jurisdiction is to allow
the supreme court to set uniform rules of law for statewide appli-
97. 299 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
98. If Potwin were to remain good law, it would not be difficult to invoke the discre-
tionary jurisdiction of the supreme court.
99. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980).
100. 338 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1976).
101. Id. at 1282 (England, J., concurring).
102. In Cenville Communities, the decision of the district court affected a single
agency; had the decision impinged on the enforcement powers of state attorneys as a class,
however, the supreme court might have had jurisdiction. Id. at 1283.
103. 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978).
104. FLA. STAT. § 74.051(3) (1979).
105. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 16.
[Vol. 34:597
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cation by the lower courts. 0 6 Conflict jurisdiction arises only when
there is a "real and embarassing conflict of opinion and author-
ity" 107 between a district court and the supreme court or among
the district courts. Amended section 3(b)(3) requires that the deci-
sion expressly and directly conflict with a decision of "another"
district court of appeal rather than "any" district court of appeal.
Prior to the amendment, conflict jurisdiction could be raised by
conflicting decisions within the same district. 08
Conflict jurisdiction may be invoked in two principal ways.10e
First, the district court might announce a rule of law that conflicts
with one previously announced by another district court or the su-
preme court."0 Only if the conflicting rule is necessary to the dis-
trict court decision, however, will the supreme court find conflict
jurisdiction."' Second, the district court might apply a consistent
rule of law to produce a result that conflicts with a previous case
involving substantially similar controlling facts.12 Once the su-
preme court finds a conflict of either type invoking its jurisdiction,
the court may proceed to hear the entire case on its merits and
106. See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958). The role of the supreme court is to
assure statewide uniformity of decision among the district courts, which are courts of last
resort rather than intermediaries between the trial court and the supreme court. See Golden
Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1976) (England,
J., concurring). For a discussion of district court jurisdiction, see notes 197-221 and accom-
panying text infra.
107. Financial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1145, 1147
(Fla. 1976).
108. See, e.g., Bowen v. Willard, 340 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1976). The court promulgated
FLA. R. App. P. 9.331, providing for en bane district court review of intradistrict conflicts. In
re Rule 9.331, 377 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1979).
109. See Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
110. Prior to the amendment, conflict certiorari could also be invoked where a district
court reached its decision by reevaluating evidence and substituting its own judgment for
that of the trier of fact. This violation of the generally accepted scope of appellate review
was held to raise a conflict with prior decisional law, even where the district court did not
expressly announce a conflicting rule of law. See Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 349
So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1977). Under the amendment, however, a district court decision reached in
a manner contrary to generally accepted rules of law may not qualify as the "express" and
direct conflict now required for invoking supreme court jurisdiction. See notes 87-89 and
accompanying text supra. Such decisions may now be unreviewable unless the requirements
for a writ of mandamus can be satisfied. See Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14, at
1046; notes 166-71 and accompanying text infra.
111. Nieman v. Nieman, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1975). When the conflicting language is
mere obiter dicta, the writ will be discharged. Ciongoli v. State, 337 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1976).
Contra, Twomey v. Clausohm, 234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970).
112. Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975). The supreme court will not find con-
flict jurisdiction where the facts support the district court decision, even though the su-
preme court might have reached a different result on those facts. Id.
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decide any points passed upon by the district court. 18
The application of the principles of conflict jurisdiction to a
decision in which the district court majority declines to write an
opinion has generated considerable debate among the justices of
the supreme court. In considering the extent to which the court
should examine such decisions for conflict, the justices have voiced
the practical concerns of judicial economy and caseload burden as
well as more fundamental issues regarding the role of the supreme
court as harmonizer of the decisions of the appellate courts of last
resort, the district courts."
In 1965 the supreme court concluded in Foley v. Weaver
Drugs, Inc.15 that its conflict certiorari jurisdiction embraced
judgments of district courts that were affirmed per curiam without
opinion, where an examination of the "record proper"11 6 revealed
that the legal effect of the affirmance created a conflict with a deci-
sion of the supreme court or another district court of appeal. In
Foley the court reversed its previous position that it would not re-
view per curiam affirmances for conflict except when a restricted
examination revealed that "a conflict had arisen with resulting in-
justice to the immediate litigant.
11 7
Ten years later, in AB CTC v. Morejon,"5 in which a per
curiam affirmance could have been based on either of two longarm
statutes,119 the supreme court found that it had jurisdiction, be-
cause the affirmance conflicted with one of two prior decisions re-
113. See, e.g., Bould v. Touchette, 349 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1977).
114. Address by the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, University of Miami
School of Law (Feb. 25, 1980). Although the cases discussed in this section demonstrate that
a majority of the court declined to limit judicially the scope of review of per curiam deci-
sions, six of the seven justices favored the constitutional amendment limiting the conflict
jurisdiction of the court, with only Justice Adkins opposed.
The principles expressed with respect to per curiam affirmances would apply as well to
per curiam reversals, but the district courts rarely produce this type of decision.
115. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
116. The Foley court defined "record proper" as "the written record of the proceedings
in the court under review except the report of the testimony." Id. at 223.
117. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958). The Foley court found that because
of this exception, the Lake rule had not diminished its caseload of per curiam affirmances.
In practice, the only distinction between a decision supported by a written opinion and a
per curiam affirmance without an opinion was whether the supreme court examined the
opinion or the "record proper" for conflict. 177 So. 2d at 223. Absent a distinction in legal
effect, the court reasoned that the former should not be given more "verity" by denying
conflict review to the latter. Id. at 224.
118. 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1976).
119. FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1979); Id. § 48.182 (repealed 1973). On an interlocutory ap-
peal, the district court had affirmed per curiam the denial of a foreign defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 324 So. 2d at 626.
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gardless of which statute the district court relied on. In an opinion
by Justice Adkins, the majority found this conflict by examining
affidavits, depositions, and trial testimony from a prior lawsuit
that the second trial court had ordered incorporated into the pre-
sent record.120 Justice England objected to this expanded view of
the "record proper" and called for a reevaluation of Foley, arguing
that the court was improvidently exercising its discretionary juris-
diction in cases requiring neither harmonization nor clari-
fication. '21
The amendment ostensibly eliminates the "record proper" as-
pect of the conflict jurisdiction controversy by requiring that the
conflict be express as well as direct.'22 It is unlikely that this
change requires the district court to state explicitly that its deci-
sion conflicts with a decision of another district or of the supreme
court. Such a declaration would be tantamount to a certification of
direct conflict under new section 3(b)(4) 1 8 and would make that
section surplusage. Therefore, the amendment apparently requires
only that conflict be evident on the face of the decision. Absent a
written opinion by a district court, no express conflict appears as a
basis for supreme court jurisdiction."2
A per curiam affirmance without a written majority opinion,
but accompanied by a dissenting or concurring opinion, presents a
question of constitutional interpretation: May the accompanying
concurrence or dissent raise a per curiam decision to the level of
''express" conflict required for jurisdiction under amended section
3(b)(3)? Even prior to the Foley case, the supreme court had con-
cluded in Huguley v. Hall 25 that a dissenting opinion to a per
curiam majority decision rendered without opinion could provide
the basis for conflict certiorari jurisdiction. 2 6 In David v. State, 27
a recent case decided before ratification of the amendment, the su-
preme court announced that "[t]his dissenting opinion may be re-
120. 324 So. 2d at 626.
121. Id. at 628-30 (England, J., dissenting).
122. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). See FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(IV) (as amended
1980) and accompanying committee notes, promulgated in In re Emergency Amendments to
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 1980).
123. See notes 143-47 and accompanying text infra.
124. See generally England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 77.
125. 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1963).
126. See, e.g., Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1973); Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1970). Contra, Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v.
Chas. W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring).
127. 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1979).
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sorted to in determining whether or not a conflict exists.M2 8
Because the amendment abolishes examination of the record
proper under the Foley doctrine, 29 this superficial resort to a dis-
senting opinion to establish conflict jurisdiction is no longer viable.
Subsequent to the amendment, the supreme court directly ad-
dressed this issue in Jenkins v. State, 30 holding that "the lan-
guage and expressions found in a dissenting or concurring opinion
cannot support jurisdiction under section 3(b)(3) because they are
not the decision of the district court of appeal."'' In a per curiam
decision, regardless of any concurring or dissenting opinions, the
single word "affirmed" does not "expressly" conflict with other
decisions.
18 2
When a per curiam decision affirms and cites a case, however,
the citation arguably could serve to express the conflict if the su-
preme court were willing to read the per curiam decision as incor-
porating by reference the opinion of the cited case. 33 More explicit
than a citation alone is a per curiam affirmance "on the authority
of" or "adopting" a cited case. 8 4 In both instances, however, the
utility of the cited case as an express statement may be limited
where it stands for more than one proposition, for it may be im-
possible to discern the basis on which the per curiam decision
rests. 35
128. Id. at 944. Although the conflict in David was with a decision within the same
district, the 1980 amendment restored the original requirement of conflict with a decision of
another district. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 115-17 and accompanying text supra.
130. 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980). Although Jenkins sought review of a putative conflict
expressed in a dissenting opinion, the supreme court also addressed its analysis to concur-
ring opinions.
131. Id. at 1359 (emphasis in original). The majority also quoted a previous opinion by
Justice Adkins: "It is conflict of decisions, not conflict of opinions or reasons that supplies
jurisdiction for review by certiorari." Id. (quoting Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 824
(Fla. 1970)) (emphasis in original). Justice Adkins alone dissented from the Jenkins deci-
sion. Id. at 1363.
132. Id. at 1359. The court defined "express" to include "to represent in words" and
"to give expression to." Id.
133. This procedure would preserve judicial economy for the reviewing court to the
same extent as if the district court had transcribed the reasoning and rule of law of the cited
case into its opinion, and the district court would save time by using citation as judicial
shorthand. Rather than examining voluminous portions of a record proper, the supreme
court need read only the opinion of a second case. On the other hand, it may be unclear
whether the district court relied on the rule of law, the reasoning, or the substantial similar-
ity of facts governing the outcome of the cited case.
134. The district court may consciously choose this form for expressing greater reliance
upon an authority than it expresses in a citation alone; or the difference may be stylistic
only.
135. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 77, at 411.
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The supreme court recently rejected this incorporation ap-
proach in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, S.A., 186 refus-
ing to reexamine the opinion of a prior case cited for authority in a
per curiam aflirmance "to determine if the contents of that cited
case now conflict with other appellate decisions."187 In accordance
with Dodi Publishing, the court also refused in Robles Del Mar,
Inc. v. Town of Indian River Shores'88 to review a putative conflict
when the per curiam affirmance cited only a decision filed the same
day in a companion case. Similarly, the supreme court found that
no direct conflict expressly appeared in a district court order dis-
missing an interlocutory appeal, citing a case, and noting the
"[t]he petitioners contend this order conflicts with other Florida
appellate decisions and with decisions of the Supreme Court it-
self."I89 These postamendment cases imply that the supreme court
intends that nothing short of a written majority opinion will suffice
to raise the express and direct conflict necessary for discretionary
conflict jurisdiction of a district court decision under amended sec-
tion 3(b)(3).
e. Interlocutory Orders
Prior to the amendment, section 3(b)(3) provided for discre-
tionary supreme court review by certiorari of interlocutory orders
passing upon matters that upon final judgment would be directly
appealable to the supreme court." " If the court granted certiorari,
it reviewed only that portion of the order which raised jurisdic-
tion."" The deletion of this provision in 1980, however, does not
necessarily foreclose all interlocutory review. Under new section
3(b)(5), the district court may certify for discretionary supreme
court review "any order" of a trial court which meets the stringent
requirements of that section.' 4 2 Those standards for certification
jurisdiction do not require, as did former section 3(b)(3), that the
interlocutory order pass upon a matter directly appealable upon
final judgment to the supreme court.
136. 385 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1980).
137. Id. at 1369.
138. 385 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1980).
139. Pena v. Tampa Fed. Say. & Loan Aaa'n, 385 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1980).
140. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1968); see Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 290
So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1974).
141. Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1975).
142. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5) (as amended 1980); see notes 146 & 155 and accompa-
nying text infra.
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3. CERTIFICATION JURISDICTION
Under former section 3(b)(3), the supreme court had discre-
tionary jurisdiction to review by certiorari any district court deci-
sion passing upon a question certified by the district court to be
"of great public interest. 1 48 This discretionary jurisdiction over
certified questions survives in amended section 3(b)(4), under
which the district courts of appeal are empowered to certify for
supreme court review both questions "of great public impor-
tance 1144 and direct conflicts with decisions of other district
courts. 45 Under new section 3(b)(5), the district courts may also
certify for supreme court review the orders and judgments of trial
courts which meet certain requirements."16 Finally, new section
3(b)(6) constitutionalizes the statute and the rule of appellate pro-
cedure providing for certification of questions of Florida law to the




The supreme court now has certification jurisdiction over
questions of great public "importance," formerly termed questions
of great public "interest," but the change is not substantive.
Rather, it reflects the pattern already developed through the exer-
143. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1968).
144. Id. § 3(b)(4) (as amended 1980) provides that the supreme court "[mlay review
any decision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of
great public importance, or that is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of
another district court of appeal."
145. This new conflict certification provision parallels the "express and direct" conflict
jurisdiction of amended § 3(b)(3), except that certification by the district court dispenses
with the issue of whether the conflict is "express." See notes 122-38 and accompanying text
supra. Although both forms of conflict jurisdiction are discretionary with the supreme court,
the exercise of that discretion is more likely in cases of conflict certified by the district court
than conflict asserted by a party.
Section 3(b)(4) makes no parallel provision for certification of conflict with supreme
court decisions, which are binding on the district courts. Absent such a provision, a district
court seeking to invite reconsideration of an established doctrine must follow the supreme
court precedent and certify a question of great public importance rather than defy the pre-
cedent and certify a conflict. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
146. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5) (as amended 1980) provides that the supreme court:
[inlay review any order or judgment of a trial court certified by the district court
of appeal in which an appeal is pending to be of great public importance, or to
have a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the state,
and certified to require immediate resolution by the supreme court.
147. Id. § 3(b)(6) provides that the supreme court "[mlay review a question of law
certified by the Supreme Court of the United States or a United States Court of Appeals
which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the
Supreme Court of Florida." As a constitutional statement of the previous practice under
FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1979) and FLA. R. APP. P. 9.510, the amendment does not change the
law in this area.
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cise of the discretionary jurisdiction of the court. In short, al-
though many questions may be interesting to the public, only a few
are important enough to require a decision by the supreme court.
In Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of
Temple Terrace,148 the court listed three factors which together
met the great public interest requirement: "the issue involved in
this case has statewide significance, important intergovernmental
consequences, and no clear precedent in this jurisdiction." ' 149 In
Lawrence v. Florida East Coast Railway,5 0 the court entertained
the certified question of whether special verdict interrogatories
must be submitted to the jury on comparative negligence issues
when requested by a party.' Although the holding of the case ap-
plied prospectively and therefore had no effect on the verdict be-
low, the tenor of the question necessarily affected a broad class of
cases not then before the court.
In strictly construing its certified question jurisdiction under
former section 3(b)(3), the supreme court required that the certify-
ing district court must itself have passed upon the issue.5"' The
petitioner's view of the import of the question was of no conse-
quence. 58 Although the petitioner's view is probably equally insig-
nificant after the amendment, the certifying district court no
longer need pass upon the question. In the alternative, the district
court in which an appeal is pending may certify a trial court order
or judgment directly to the supreme court without deciding the is-
sue. The district court must certify, first, that the question is ei-
ther of great public importance or will have a great effect on the
proper administration of justice throughout the state, and second,
that the question requires immediate resolution by the supreme
court.1' These stringent requirements suggest that a narrow inter-
148. 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
149. Id. at 612. The question was to what extent are state agencies immune from mu-
nicipal zoning ordinances. The supreme court accepted the balancing test adopted by the
district court which required the agency to seek local approval for non-conforming land use.
Id.
150. 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977).
151. The supreme court held that special verdicts are required in all jury trials involv-
ing comparative negligence. In nonjury trials, the court is required to make findings on the
record equivalent to a special verdict. Id. at 1017.
152. Revitz v. Baya, 355 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1977).
153. Bullard v. Wainwright, 313 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1975).
154. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(5) (as amended 1980); FLA. R. App. P. 9.125, promul-
gated in In re Emergency Amendments to Rules of Appellate Procedure, 381 So. 2d 1370,
1384 (Fla. 1980). The Hillsborough Association case, which listed "statewide significance"
and "important governmental consequences" as factors in discerning a great public interest
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pretation of certification jurisdiction may continue after the
amendment.
But a broader interpretation of this jurisdiction is in order if
the expansion of certification to include new areas is viewed as a
counterbalance to the reductions made by the amendment in other
areas of supreme court jurisdiction. The new provision for district
court certification of trial court decisions corresponds to the dele-
tions from section 3(b) of direct trial court review. 15 5 Lower court
constructions of federal statutes, eliminated from supreme court
review by the amendment, may now be appealable only through
the certification process, if at all.156 Rather than restricting certifi-
cation, the specific requirements of amended section 3(b)(5) should
be read simply as guidelines for the screening of the supreme
court's potential caseload, a task being shifted to the district
courts through the expansion of certification jurisdiction and the
corresponding reductions elsewhere.
4. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Under section 3(b), the supreme court has original jurisdiction
to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, "and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its ju-
risdiction.' 5 7 The amendment renumbers the subsections provid-
ing for writs of mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, but
under former § 3(b)(3), will probably be a leading authority in the early interpretations of
the alternative standard in new § 3(b)(5), requiring "great effect on the proper administra-
tion of justice throughout the state." See notes 148 & 149 and accompanying text supra.
155. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (as amended 1980). The amendment eliminates su-
preme court jurisdiction of trial court orders passing on the validity of statutes or constitu-
tional provisions under § 3(b)(1), trial court sentences of life imprisonment under § 3(b)(2),
and trial court interlocutory orders passing upon matters appealable on final judgment to
the supreme court under § 3(b)(3). See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
156. Id. § 3(b)(1) (1968). Although the amendment reclassifies decisions construing the
federal constitution from mandatory to discretionary supreme court jurisdiction, it elimi-
nates any mention of decisions passing on the validity of federal statutes or treaties. See
notes 74-78 and accompanying text supra. Certification jurisdiction might be available if the
district court interpretation of the federal statute or treaty raised a question of great public
importance or directly conflicted with a decision of another district court under § 3(b)(4).
Similarly, a trial court interpretation of the statute or treaty might raise questions qualify-
ing for certification by the district court under § 3(b)(5). A third possibility would be an
express and direct conflict with another district court's construction of the federal statute,
invoking discretionary review under § 3(b)(3) without certification by the district court.
157. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(7) (as amended 1980). The court must first have inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds, however, before it may exercise the all writs power, which is
limited to ancillary relief. See Shevin v. Public Service Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1976).
For a discussion of these extraordinary writs and their availability in the Florida courts,
see Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14.
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the constitutional wording remains unchanged. 15 8 The amendment
eliminates the jurisdiction of the supreme court to issue writs of
certiorari to commissions established by general law having state-
wide jurisdiction. 159 This change, together with the deletion of the
words "by certiorari" from the discretionary jurisdiction provisions
of section 3(b)(3), apparently leaves the supreme court without ex-
press certiorari jurisdiction.110
a. Writs of Prohibition
The supreme court may issue writs of prohibition to prevent a
lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction.' The amendment ex-
paids this power by eliminating the requirement that such writs
issue only "in causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court
to review. ' 162 The court now has supervisory powers over all lower
court cases.163 On the other hand, the supreme court no longer has
discretionary jurisdiction to issue writs of prohibition to commis-
sions.1" This change is consistent with shifting to the district
courts the jurisdiction to review almost all commission and admin-
158. The mandamus and quo warranto provisions were moved from § 3(b)(5) to §
3(b)(8), while the habeas corpus provision in § 3(b)(6) became § 3(b)(9).
159. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1968).
160. Id. (as amended 1980). Unlike the district courts and circuit courts, the supreme
court lacks authority to grant common law certiorari relief. See Dresner v. City of Tallahas-
see, 164 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1964). For a discussion of the "by certiorari" deletion and its im-
pact on discretionary jurisdiction, see England, Hunter & Williams, .supra note 77, at 411.
161. Prior to the amendment, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (1968) provided that the
supreme court "[mlay issue writs of prohibition to courts and commissions in causes within
the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review." See Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note
14, at 1049.
162. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (1968). The amendment deletes the phrase "and com-
missions in causes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review." Id. § 3(b)(7) (as
amended 1980).
163. The supreme court appeared to be moving toward the same broad prohibition ju-
risdiction as mandated by the constitutional amendment. In State ex rel. Sarasota County v.
Boyer, 360 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1978), the court held that its "prohibition jurisdiction [is] in-
voked properly where there has been shown our potential to review a pending proceeding
upon its conclusion." Id. at 392 (emphasis added). The court found without merit the claim
that its prohibition power could be exercised only where there would be an appeal of right
under § 3(b)(1). The court explained:
We will not adopt such a severely restricted view of our power of prohibition.
We have not done so in practice in the past. If prohibition is to remain a preven-
tive remedy, to adopt such a construction would leave us with no prohibition
power whatsoever, and, therefore, would make the constitutional provision
meaningless.
Id. at 391.
164. See notes 161 & 162 supra.
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istrative agency decisions. 168
b. Writs of Mandamus
The supreme court may exercise its mandamus power to com-
mand the performance of a preexisting ministerial duty.' ee This ex-
traordinary measure may be invoked only if no other adequate
remedy exists. 1 7 Thus, the court will deny the writ to a party who
fails to file seasonably for appellate review and awaits the expira-
tion of the filing period to seek mandamus, which has no such time
constraints.
68
Mandamus may be used by the executive department to expe-
dite a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. In Division of
Bond Finance v. Smathers,189 Governor Askew requested that the
supreme court command the Secretary of State to expunge an al-
legedly unconstitutional legislative proviso from a general appro-
priations bill.170 The court accepted jurisdiction and granted the
writ of mandamus, using the following standard: writs will issue
"where the functions of government will be adversely affected
without an immediate determination. ' 'l71 The circumstances of
Smathers met that standard because the state was under a con-
tractual time constraint with respect to a land purchase to be
made from funds allotted in the questioned appropriations bill.
The court issued the writ of mandamus and commanded the Secre-
tary to expunge the proviso, which was found unconstitutional.
165. Although enabling legislation pursuant to amended § 3(b)(2) will make certain ac-
tions of utilities agencies directly. appealable to the supreme court, the court literally has no
prohibition power over the commissions subject to this appellate jurisdiction. Yet the court
may issue writs of mandamus to state agencies under § 3(b)(8), leading to the incongruity
that the supreme court can order a state agency action but cannot prevent it. Because the
court would already have jurisdiction under § 3(b)(2), it is arguable that the all writs clause
could be invoked to prohibit agency action in circumstances requiring expeditious relief. See
note 157 supra; Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14, at 1058.
166. State ex rel. Evans v. Chappel, 308 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975). FLA. CONST. art. V, §
3(b)(8) (as amended 1980) provides that the supreme court "[m]ay issue writs of mandamus
and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies."
167. See Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14, at 1046-49.
168. Shevin v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 333 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1976).
169. 337 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1976).
170. In the alternative, if the proviso were deemed constitutional, Governor Askew re-
quested a finding that his veto of the proviso was valid. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a) provides
that the governor may not veto a restriction or qualification to an appropriation without
also vetoing the appropriation.





a. Discipline of Judges
The supreme court has original jurisdiction to discipline or re-
move from office a justice or judge, upon recommendation of two-
thirds of the members of the Judicial Qualifications Commission.7 2
By petition, the party recommended for removal may challenge the
Commission's findings of fact and its recommendations before the
supreme court.17 3 The findings of the Commission are of persuasive
force and are given great weight by the court. The ultimate power
and responsibility for making the determination, however, rest in
the court, not in the Commission.
74
The Commission must make a clear and convincing showing to
meet the standard of proof necessary for an adverse finding.15 In
In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge,176 the court established that a
judge may be removed from office for conduct unbecoming a mem-
ber of the judiciary where such conduct is "proved by evidence of
an accumulation of small and ostensibly innocuous incidents
which, when considered together, emerge as a pattern of hostile
conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.' 77 In this case,
the behavior of the judge reflected a pattern of decisionmaking
based on his personal concepts of right and wrong without due re-
gard for the law. He challenged the recommendation for removal
on the ground that the Commission had not proved any corrupt
motive. He asserted, and the record reflected, that he had been
guided in every instance by sincere concern for the parties before
him. The court recognized this response as a valid defense notwith-
standing the amendment to section 12(f), which specifically de-
clares that malafides, scienter, or moral turpitude is no longer a
172. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(f).
173. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978).
174. In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977). Similarly, the Commission is empow-
ered to adopt rules governing its proceedings, but these rules, or any part thereof, may be
repealed by the supreme court, if five justices concur, or by the legislature. FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 12(d). The rulemaking authority is limited to proceedings within the Commission and
does not extend to the procedures of appellate review in the court. The court repealed a
Commission rule which prescribed the timing and manner for filing petitions for review of
Commission actions before the supreme court. In re Rules of Fla. Judicial Qualifications
Comm'n, 364 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1978).
175. 341 So. 2d at 516. This standard is greater than a "preponderance of the evidence"
but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
176. 357 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1978).
177. Id. at 177 (quoting In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970)).
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
requirement for removal.' 78 Because the behavior complained of
took place before the constitution was amended, the new standards
did not apply to him.
179
The standard of ethical behavior for judges is higher than that
of attorneys, because judges are representatives of the judicial pro-
cess and any departures from a high standard of behavior reflect
adversely upon the judicial system and erode public confidence in
the judiciary.180 Although the court will discipline judges for lesser
offenses, it will mete out the extreme discipline of removal only if a
judge has "intentionally committed serious and grievous wrongs of
a clearly unredeeming nature."' 8 '
b. Discipline of Attorneys
The supreme court has constitutional jurisdiction, under arti-
cle V, section 15, to regulate the admission of attorneys to the bar
and to discipline attorneys.1' The court delegates to the Florida
Bar the task of screening grievances, gathering facts, and recom-
mending disciplinary measures. 88 In this capacity, the bar acts as
an "arm of the court," and the scope of its authority is measured
by the reach of the jurisdiction of the court. " The bar's jurisdic-
tion is exclusive from the time the bar finds probable cause for
discipline'8" and continues through the final determination. 8 6
The regulation of the practice of law is comprehensive. By
overseeing the admissions to the bar, the court may prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. 87 With the influx of Latin Americans
178. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(f).
179. 357 So. 2d at 180-81.
180. 341 So. 2d at 517-18.
181. Id. at 518. This statement appears to read scienter and malafides back into the
disciplinary provision of the constitution, at least where removal is recommended.
182. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15 provides: "The supreme court shall have exclusive juris-
diction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of
persons admitted."
See generally England, In Defense of Regulation by the Supreme Court, 54 FLA. B.J.
254 (1980).
183. FLA. BAR INTEGR. RULE, art. XI.
184. Florida Bar v. McCain, 330 So. 2d 712, 714 (Fla. 1976).
185. Ordinarily, the court does not entertain interlocutory questions in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Where an attack on the finding of probable cause was couched in language chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors, however, it was analogized to a writ of
prohibition, and the court accepted the interlocutory appeal. Id. at 713-14; see notes 161-65
and accompanying text supra.
186. Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978) (resulting in disbarment).
187. Cf. note 67 and accompanying text supra (prevention of unauthorized practice of
law through the rulemaking power of the court).
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into Florida, the court has authorized the bar to use the grievance
procedure to police the practice of law-by Latin American notaries
public.1"
Attorneys are subject to discipline not only for misconduct in
legal dealings with clients but also for deceit, dishonesty, or mis-
representation in matters of private business. The bar disciplines
such behavior by an attorney because it reflects upon his ability to
practice law.1 89 Moreover, although the court has exclusive discipli-
nary jurisdiction under section 15, the legislature may make cer-
tain attorney conduct criminal, if found to be inimical to the pub-
lic welfare. In Pace v. State,90 the court found that a statute
outlawing direct or indirect solicitation of business by attorneys
lay within the police power of the state because the banned activ-
ity represented a social evil encompassing unethical behavior.' 9'
The constitution and the rules do not state whether the bar or
the Judicial Qualifications Commission is the proper body to con-
sider discipline of a former judge for conduct alleged to have oc-
curred while on the bench. In Florida Bar v. McCain,192 a former
justice of the supreme court and district court judge challenged the
power of the bar to discipline him as an attorney. The court re-
jected his challenge because, upon resignation as a judge, he had
"automatically resume[d] his status as an attorney at law subject
to be disciplined under the Integration Rule" of the Florida Bar.'"
The exclusivity of the power of the court to regulate attorney
discipline under section 15 occasionally raises interesting issues
about the separation of powers. In an advisory opinion requested
by the Florida Bar,'" the supreme court held that officials of the
bar serving the court in an administrative or supervisory capacity
were not state officers or employees subject to the Financial Disclo-
188. Florida Bar v. Borges-Caignet, 321 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1975).
189. Florida Bar v. Davis, 373 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1979).
190. 368 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1979).
191. Id. at 345. The court also found the first amendment challenge to the statute with-
out merit, distinguishing recent United States Supreme Court decisions, including Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Pace decision appears to represent the outer reaches of
the legislative power to regulate the practice of law, an area which the constitution reposes
exclusively in the supreme court.
192. 330 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1976). This case of first impression elicited five written opin-
ions (the majority, two concurring and two dissenting).
193. Id. at 716 (referring to article XI of the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, by
which the Supreme Court of Florida has delegated certain disciplinary functions to the Bar).
194. In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975); see note 373 and accompanying text
infra.
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sure Law. 195 Similarly, a grant of transactional immunity by the
executive branch to an attorney who agreed to testify in a criminal
case did not extend to disciplinary proceedings before the Florida
Bar, for such immunity may be obtained solely by application to
the supreme court.196
D. District Court Jurisdiction
The district courts of appeal have residuary jurisdiction
1 9
7 of
all appeals not directly appealable to the supreme court under arti-
cle V, section 3, or to a circuit court'98 under article V, section 5.
By reducing the jurisdiction of the supreme court in several areas,
the constitutional amendment expands the role of the district
courts."'9 Trial court orders of the circuit courts that pass on the
validity of a state or federal statute, formerly within the
mandatory jurisdiction of the supreme court, are now appealable
only to the district courts.2 00 Similarly, the district courts now re-
195. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145 (1979). The Financial Disclosure Law requires "[elach state
or local officer and each specified employee," as defined, to file an annual "statement of
financial interests," disclosing certain sources of income, ownership of real property, debts,
gifts received, and the identity of the donors.
Based on a similar rationale, the court invalidated 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-63 as applied
to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners. This statute required state agencies, including the
Board, to modify examinations which they administered, allowing deaf and blind applicants
to compete more equitably. An agent or employee intentionally violating the statute could
be fined a maximum of $500 for a second degree misdemeanor. In re Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977).
196. Ciravolo v. Florida Bar, 361 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1978); see notes 357-61 and accompa-
nying text infra. Cf. State v. Brodski, 369 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (law students
treated as if attorneys).
197. District courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be
taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or orders of trial courts, includ-
ing those entered on review of administrative action, not directly appealable'to
the supreme court or a circuit court. They may review interlocutory orders in
such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1).
198. Review of circuit court appellate decisions by the district court is discretionary
under common law certiorari, rather than mandatory pursuant to its jurisdiction over ap-
peals as a matter of right. To warrant certiorari, the writ must allege that the circuit court
exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise departed from the essential requirements of the law.
The district court may not reevaluate or reweigh the evidence, but may examine the record
to determine if the ruling below was based on competent and sufficient evidence. Mere error
by the circuit court will not sustain an argument that the court exceeded its jurisdiction or
departed from the essential requirements of law. Grandin Lake Shores Ass'n, Inc. v. Under-
wood, 351 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); see Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14, at
1060.
199. See notes 71-84 and accompanying text supra.
200. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1) (1968). County trial court orders passing on statutory
validity are reviewed by the circuit courts, from which an appeal to the supreme court no
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view the actions of commissions having statewide jurisdiction,
other than those governing utilities2 0 1
The amendment gives district court decisions a greater mea-
sure of finality, because many such decisions formerly appealable
to the supreme court as a matter of right are now either within the
discretionary review of the supreme court or not reviewable at all.
The supreme court may choose to review a district court decision
that expressly declares a state statute valid.20 2 A district court,
however, may foreclose such review by rendering a decision on ap-
peal without writing an opinion.2 0 3
The precedential value of district court decisions may differ,
depending on the court applying the decision. It has been held, for
example, that circuit courts are bound equally by all district court
decisions, regardless of whether the circuit court lies within the
same appellate district.2' Because the district courts are courts of
last resort, except for the narrow category of cases raising
mandatory supreme court jurisdiction, 0 5 their decisions should
have the same precedential value in the hierarchy of decisional law
as those of the supreme court. On the other hand, the decisions of
district courts are merely persuasive to other district courts, be-
cause they are of equal status and because the supreme court has
jurisdiction to resolve conflicting decisions.20 6 In the event of an
interdistrict conflict, the decision of a particular district court on
that issue is binding upon any trial court within its appellate
district.
207
The district courts have original jurisdiction to hear extraordi-
nary writs.20 With respect to habeas corpus, the district courts
share concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme court and the cir-
cuit courts.20 8 Concurrent jurisdiction, however, does not give a pe-
titioner three bites at the apple. Once any one of these courts has
longer lies. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text infra.
201. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
202. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (as amended 1980).
203. See note 89 supra.
204. State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). "[A] circuit court wheresoever
situated in Florida is equally bound by a decision of a District Court of Appeal regardless of
its appellate district." Id. at 52.
205. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
206. See notes 106-39 and accompanying text supra.
207. 333 So. 2d 51. The court certified the question of hierarchy of precedent to the
supreme court.
208. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(3). See generally Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note
14.
209. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 3(b)(9), 4(b)(3), 5(b).
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denied the writ, the doctrine of res judicata prevents him from
bringing subsequent petitions upon the same subject matter.2 10
The district courts have the power to issue a writ of prohibi-
tion to prevent a lower court from acting in excess of its jurisdic-
tion.21 One district court of appeal has extended this power to sit-
uations in which the circuit court should have exercised judicial
restraint and declined to accept equity jurisdiction. In State ex rel.
Department of General Services v. Willis, 1' the District Court of
Appeal, First District, considered whether the circuit court had the
power to grant injunctive relief against a state agency for alleged
injuries to a group of general contractors who had not availed
themselves of administrative remedies provided by the state Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act."' After concluding that the Act "did
not directly or indirectly authorize circuit court proceedings to en-
join administrative action,"'" 4 the court considered whether, not-
withstanding the Act, injunctive relief incidental to the constitu-
tional powers of the judiciary was available. The district court held
that "collateral review" of agency action, by virtue of the constitu-
tional power of the circuit courts to issue injunctions and writs,
was not subject to the same. legislative restrictions as "direct re-
view."' 15 But because the Act offered an array of remedies for ad-
ministrative error which were judicially reviewable, the court found
that no extraordinary need for equitable intervention had been
shown," ' and granted the writ of prohibition against circuit court
210. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n v. Baker, 346 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
The petitioner may, however, appeal a lower court denial of the writ to a reviewing court
under its appellate jurisdiction.
211. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(3).
212. 344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
213. Id. at 583-84. The Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1970)
(as amended 1975), provides a comprehensive statutory plan for the resolution of adminis-
trative problems.
214. 344 So. 2d at 588-89. The court considered what judicial relief had been available
by statute before the Act was passed in 1974, which of those remedies the Act was intended
to replace, and which remedies were restored by the 1975 amendment to the Act. Id. at 585.
215. Id. at 589. The legislature must define by general law the power of direct review of
administrative action in the circuit court. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
The injunctive power of the circuit court, however, remained subject to judicial re-
straint under the two doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies. "The
one counsels judicial abstention when claims otherwise cognizable in the courts have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; the other, when available
administrative remedies would serve as well as judicial ones." 344 So. 2d at 589.
216. The court gave a laundry list of claims for which judicial interference might be
warranted:
Does the complaint of the respondent contractors demonstrate some compelling




A different administrative review question was raised in 4245
Corp. v. Division of Beverage.21 8 The First District held that even
if a proposed rule has been neither adopted nor enforced against
the petitioner, the order of a hearing officer upholding the validity
of the rule in a special "rule challenge" proceeding before the Divi-
sion of Administrative Hearings 19 constitutes a final agency action
raising district court appellate jurisdiction.220 The court chided the
Division of Beverage for opposing judicial review, pointing out that
acceptance of the Division's argument would also preclude review
of a ruling adverse to the Division, requiring withdrawal of any
proposed rule found wholly or partly invalid."1
E. Circuit Court Jurisdiction
The circuit courts of the state are superior courts of general
jurisdiction. As a general rule, "nothing is outside the jurisdiction
of a superior court of general jurisdiction except that which is
clearly vested in other courts or tribunals, or is clearly outside of
ance against the Department, and why the circuit court must therefore inter-
vene? We think it does not. No lack of general authority in the Department is
suggested; nor is it shown, if that is the case, that the Act has no remedy for it.
No illegal conduct by the Department is shown; nor, if that is the case, that the
Act cannot remedy the illegality. No departmental ignorance of the law, the
facts or the public good is shown; nor, if any of that is the case, that the Act
provides no remedy for it. No claim is made the Department ignores or refuses
to recognize relators' substantial interests, or refuses to afford a hearing, or oth-
erwise refuses to recognize that relators' grievance is cognizable administratively.
The respondent contractors have made no showing that remedies available
under the Act are inadequate.
344 So. 2d at 591.
217. "The determination of whether the circumstances of a particular controversy war-
rant judicial intervention, then, is ultimately one of policy rather than power . . . ." Gulf
Pines Memorial Park, Inc. v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 1978)
(discussing Willis). See also Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d 1343 (Fla.
1978). For a discussion and criticism of the approach taken by the supreme court in these
two cases, see Swan, Administrative Adjudication of Constitutional Questions: Confusion
in Florida Law and a Dying Misconception in Federal Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 527
(1979).
218. 348 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
219. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1979). This section of the Administrative Procedure Act
provides for challenge to a proposed rule before a hearing officer as "an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority."
220. The court listed three occasions for appellate challenge to a rule: after an adminis-
trative hearing officer has found a prospective rule valid, after the agency adopts the rule,
and after enforcement proceedings by an agency have determined the substantial interests
of a party. 348 So. 2d at 934.
221. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4)(c) (1979).
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and beyond the jurisdiction vested in such circuit courts by the
Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto. 2 22 Be-
cause this jurisdiction is so broad, one who seeks a writ of prohibi-
tion from a supervisory appellate court 223 faces difficulties in estab-
lishing that a circuit court is about to act outside its jurisdiction. 4
The circuit courts have been categorized into divisions for ad-
ministrative efficiency, although each retains its constitutional and
statutory power to hear all general jurisdiction cases. When a case
that comes before a particular division of the circuit court would
be heard more effectively in a different division, the proper proce-
dure is to request a transfer through the chief judge of the circuit,
rather than to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.22 5
Article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution vests the
circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction, when provided by general
law.2 2 The Florida Statutes define this jurisdiction to include cases
222. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1977) (quoting State ex rel. B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Trammell, 140 Fla. 500, 504, 192 So. 175, 177 (1939)).
A challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court may be raised for the
first time on appeal in a collateral attack upon the judgment. Lack of subject matter juris-
diction is a fundamental error, and a judgment rendered without it is void. Waters v. State,
354 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); DiCapaio v. State, 352 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert.
denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (1977).
223. See Brummer, Morris & Rosen, supra note 14, at 1050; notes 161-65 and accompa-
nying text supra.
224. In English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977), a newspaper reporter petitioned
the district court for a writ of prohibition to compel the chancellor of the circuit court to
reopen a marriage dissolution hearing that the chancellor had closed to the public and press.
The district court denied the writ and the supreme court affirmed, holding that because the
chancellor had jurisdiction to exercise his discretion and close the hearing, prohibition
would not lie. A charge of abuse of discretion is suited to a writ of error, not of prohibition.
Justices England and Sundberg dissented because the reporter, not being a party to the
action, would not have access to the courts through a writ of error. Denial of the writ of
prohibition effectively precluded the press from challenging the closing of the proceedings.
Id. at 299. By promulgating FLA. R. Aip. P. 9.100(d), the court has dealt with the problem
described by the dissenters,
225. Guardianship of Bentley, 342 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
226. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county
courts, and jurisdiction of appeals, when provided by general law. They shall
have the power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition
and habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of
their jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the circuit court shall be uniform throughout
the state. They shall have the power of direct review of administrative action
prescribed by general law.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Casa Dev. Ltd., 332 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), the
question arose whether a special law rather than a general law could confer appellate juris-
diction on a circuit court. The court determined that only a general law could do so, because
both the text and the spirit of article V contemplated a uniform statewide court system.
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arising in county courts, except when an appeal may be taken to
the supreme court.2 The circuit courts may also issue writs of cer-
tiorari228 to review rulings of commissions and boards acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity. 2'9 Jurisdiction for this certiorari review de-
rives not from statutory authorization but from the constitutional
grant of circuit court power to issue writs. This grant is interpreted
to encompass common law certiorari, which is separate and dis-
tinct from the statutory certiorari also provided for in section
5(b).28
III. THE LEGISLATURE
The lawmaking power of the state is vested in the legisla-
ture, 91 which has broad discretion to determine the public interest
and may pass laws under its police power protecting health,
morals, comfort, and the general welfare.2 - 2 The legislature may
adopt provisions of federal statutes and administrative rules in ef-
fect at the time of legislation, but may not adopt any such act or
rule in advance of its actual passage.233 To be a valid exercise of
the police power of the state, legislation must apply to the general
public rather than to a specific group.2 4 When an act potentially
227. FLA. STAT. § 26.012 (1979). See also Jaramillo v. City of Homestead, 322 So. 2d 496
(Fla. 1975), holding that where a municipality adopts a state statute as a municipal ordi-
nance, a finding by the trial court that the local law is unconstitutional is an invalidation of
a municipal ordinance with review available in the circuit court, not an invalidation of a
state statute with review available in the supreme court.
The 1980 amendment to § 3(b)(1) moots the Jaramillo holding, however, because no
direct appeal to the supreme court now lies from trial court invalidations of state statutes.
Furthermore, supreme court review of appellate decisions passing on statutory validity now
lies only from the district courts, and not from the circuit courts. Thus, a county court
invalidation of a state statute affirmed on appeal by the circuit court would be final and
unreviewable by the supreme court, absent exercise of the district court's discretionary cer-
tiorari jurisdiction. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 77, at 409; note 198 supra.
228. Circuit court certiorari may be interlocutory where petitioner does not have an
adequate remedy if he waits to appeal a final judgment. Tampa v. Ippolito, 360 So. 2d 1316,
1317 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
229. The standard of review is limited, however, to a determination that the acts of the
commission or board were arbitrary, capricious, confiscatory, or violative of constitutional
guarantees. 332 So. 2d at 654.
230. G-W Dev. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 317 So. 2d
829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
231. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
232. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 290 So. 2d 13, 18 (Fla. 1974).
233. Brazil v. Division of Admin., State Dep't of Trans., 347 So. 2d 755, 757-58 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977).
234. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So. 2d 560, 564 (Fla. 1976) (citing Liquor
Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1949)).
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benefits one limited class at the expense of another, the public wel-
fare must be weighed against the rights being affected. 35
A. Delegation of Power
The lawmaking power may not be delegated to an administra-
tive agency.2' 6 The power to enact a law, to declare what the law is,
or to apply the law with unrestricted discretion may not be dele-
gated.3 7 Statutes giving the police power of the state to an admin-
istrative agency must provide clear and specific objective guide-
lines to prevent the agency from exercising unbridled discretion.2 3 8
Opportunity for partiality in enforcing or applying a statute indi-
cates that the legislature was both lax and inexact in delegating its
power.2 39
In High Ridge Management Corp. v. State,'240 operators of li-
censed South Florida nursing homes successfully challenged the
Omnibus Nursing Home Reform Act of 1976,11 which purported to
establish five categories for rating nursing home facilities. The
level of state vendor payments was made dependent on these rat-
ings. Because no objective guidelines for rating were established in
the Act, the section creating the ratings was declared unconstitu-
tional under article III, section 1, as an unlawful delegation of leg-
islative authority. Similarly, the supreme court in Harrington &
Co. v. Tampa Port Authority'"4 held unconstitutional a statute au-
235. In United Gas Pipe Line Co., the supreme court invalidated 1973 Fla. Laws ch.
73-289, which had given the Public Service Commission limited jurisdiction to investigate
allegations initiated by industrial purchasers of energy from an authorized company that
"the rates and charges of the company are either discriminatory or unreasonably high." 336
So. 2d at 562. The statute had also granted the commission the right to regulate those prices
notwithstanding the exemption of this class of energy sales from the jurisdiction of the Pub-
lic Service Commission in FLA. STAT. § 366.02 (1973). Regardless of the announced public
purpose of preventing discriminatory or unreasonably high prices to the public, the supreme
court held that the legislature cannot authorize some price ceilings upon consumer initiative
without regulating the rest of the industry. Although repeal of the exemption from regula-
tion would be constitutionally permissible, selective regulation at the expense of private
contractual rights is an abuse of legislative power.
236. Askew v. Cross Keys Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978). For a discussion
of delegations invalidated under the separation of powers doctrine of article II, § 3, see notes
326-36 and accompanying text infra.
237. Florida State Bd. of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So. 2d 653, 655 (Fla. 1979).
238. High Ridge Management Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1977).
239. Harrington & Co. v. Tampa Port Auth., 358 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 1978).
240. 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1977).
241. FLA. STAT. § 400.23 (Supp. 1976) (held unconstitutional in High Ridge Manage-
ment Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1977)).
242. 358 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1978).
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thorizing licensing of stevedores by the Port Authority, since the
only language limiting the agency's decision was "as it may deem
necessary, having due regard to the business of the port and
harbor."
2 43
A statute designed to accomplish a public purpose may ex-
pressly authorize designated officials or agencies to enact rules and
regulations to make the statute effective2 44 The basic limitation on
this power is that these rules and regulations must be proper and
necessary to the exercise of the agency's power and performance in
carrying out a clearly stated legislative objective.245 In Florida
State Board of Architecture v. Wasserman,s4 6 the court considered
a challenged statute which listed no explicit standards to guide the
State Board of Architecture in determining whether an applicant
"had training which shall be found by the board to be fully
equivalent to [a] degree [from a school or college of architec-
ture]."24  The supreme court upheld the statute, finding that the
legislature intended that widely recognized academic standards of
professional schools of architecture be the measure for evaluating
an applicant's training.
B. One Subject, Expressed in Title
In the exercise of its vested power, the legislature must enact
laws that "embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." 48
In State v. Lee,4 the supreme court held that a law which dealt
243. FLA. STAT. § 310.28 (1973) (held unconstitutional in Harrington & Co. v. Tampa
Port Auth., 358 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1978)).
244. Florida Canners Ass'n v. State Dep't of Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503, 512 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979).
245. Id. In Florida Canners Ass'n, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
that the delegation of rulemaking authority to the Department of Citrus, which adopted a
rule requiring a declaration of state origin on grapefruit products packaged in retail contain-
ers in Florida, was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power, as long as the rule was
necessary for the accomplishment of the legislative purpose.
246. 377 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1979). The court also said that if a statute is reasonably sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, only one of which would render it valid, the court must
adopt that view. Id. at 656.
See also Dunnigan v. State, 364 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1978) (holding FLA. STAT. § 812.014
(1977) constitutional). Although the statute which listed certain specific theft violations in-
cluded "[o]ther conduct similar in nature," the court held that the specific enumerations
provided sufficient standards for guiding prosecutorial or judicial discretion. 364 So. 2d at
1218.
247. FLA. STAT. § 467.08(1)(b)(5) (1977) (repealed 1979).
248. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
249. 356 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1978).
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comprehensively with automobile insurance rates and included as-
pects of tort litigation arising primarily from automobile negli-
gence did not embrace more than one subject. The court explained
that "the subject of the law is that which is expressed in the title,"
which may be as broad as the legislature decides, as long as the
matters included in it have a "natural and logical connection.
2 5 0
Justice Sundberg argued in dissent that the law violated the pur-
pose for which he perceived the constitutional provision had been
adopted, the prevention of "logrolling ' '2 51 and combinations of un-
related provisions and incongruous subjects, not specified in the
title, which might escape attention and win unknowing approval in
the legislature.
In State v. McDonald252 the court upheld a statute that
decriminalized traffic violations and simultaneously created a crim-
inal penalty for refusing to sign a traffic citation. The supreme
court asserted that a law does not embrace more than one subject
if the title is sufficiently broad to connect it with the subject mat-
ter of the enactment.2
5 8
Essentially, the purpose of the requirement that legislation
embrace only one subject, expressed in the title, is both to provide
fair notice to the legislature, for knowledgeable lawgiving,25 4 and to
offer the average person a reasonable chance to foresee that his or
her interests might be affected. 5' The title must be broad enough
to include all matters contained in the body of the legislation, but
it need not index every detail of the contents.2 56 The title must
not, however, mislead the legislature or the public about the scope
of the law. 57
C. Special Laws
Similar concerns25 8 underlie article III, section 10, which pro-
250. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
251. "Logrolling" is the unacceptable practice of attaching unwanted and uncorrelated
provisions to favored legislation to force a legislator to choose between either voting for the
desired legislation with the undesired amendments or voting against desired legislation to
kill the amendments.
252. 357 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1978).
253. Id. at 407. See also Smith v. City of St. Petersburg, 302 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1974).
254. Smathers v. Smith, 338 So. 2d 825, 828 (Fla. 1976).
255. North Ridge Gen. Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461, 464 (Fla. 1979).
256. Id.; Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055, 1058 n.14 (Fla. 1976).
257. Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431, 435 (Fla. 1979) (scope represents the common
meaning, not technical refinements); Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975) (title must
not mislead or be so construed as to avert inquiry as to provisions).
258. In North Ridge Gen. Hosp. v. City of Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1979),
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vides that the legislature may not pass special laws unless notice of
intention to seek their enactment has been published as provided
by general law. Such notice is unnecessary if the special law is to
become effective only upon approval by the voters of the area
affected.
A special law is a statute relating to particular persons, things,
or subjects of a class.260 It may also be a local law." ' A law not
universal in application is not necessarily a special law if the classi-
fications created by the legislature are reasonable, are based upon
proper differences inherent in or peculiar to the class, and are uni-
formly applied to all persons in the same situation.
0 2
Certain special laws and general laws of local applications" are
prohibited. 2" Those prohibitions recently litigated include special
the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a special law annexing the property of the
hospital to the city of Oakland Park. Although neither the notice nor the title specifically
identified the property to be annexed, the court held that the subject of annexation of prop-
erty to the city was sufficient to notify the hospital that its property, which was contiguous
to municipal boundaries, might be included in the proposed annexation. The purpose of
publication of notice of intention is to provide reasonable notice to persons whose interests
may be directly affected by the proposed legislation. Id. at 464.
259. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10.
260. City of Pompano Beach v. Lewis, 368 So. 2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 1979).
261. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g). A local law affects only one municipality or appropri-
ates funds of a given locality. 368 So. 2d at 1301.
262. Cesary v. Second Nat'l Bank, 369 So. 2d 917, 920-21 (Fla. 1979). The court in
Cesary held that two statutes creating exceptions to the Florida usury law for savings banks
and Morris Plan banks were not special laws and did not violate article III, § 11(a)(9), which
prohibits special laws pertaining to "fixing of interest rates on private contracts."
A statute which classifies judges' salaries by county population, but applies equally to
all counties, is not a special law, Lewis v. Mathis, 345 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1977), and the
classification is reasonably related to the subject of the law. Id.; FLA. CONST. art. III, §
ll(a)(21)(b).
263. A general law of local application is a law using a method of classification that
makes the law applicable to particular localities only. City of Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363
So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1978).
264. FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 11 provides:
Prohibited special laws.-
(a) There shall be no special law or general law of local application per-
taining to:
(1) election, jurisdiction or duties of officers, except officers of municipali-
ties, chartered counties, special districts or local governmental agencies;
(2) assessment or collection of taxes for state or county purposes, including
extension of time therefor, relief of tax officers from due performance of their
duties, and relief of their sureties from liability;
(3) rules of evidence in any court;
(4) punishment for crimes;
(5) petit juries, including compensation of jurors, except establishment of
jury commissions;
(6) change of civil or criminal venue;
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laws pertaining to elections, " 5 jurisdiction or duties of officers, " '
assessment or collection of taxes for state or county purposes, " 7
and disposal of public property, including any interest therein, for
private purposes.6 8
(7) conditions precedent to bringing any civil or criminal proceedings, or
limitations of time therefor;
(8) refund of money legally paid or remission of fines, penalties or
forfeitures;
(9) creation, enforcement, extension or impairment of liens based on pri-
vate contracts, or fixing of interest rates on private contracts;
(10) disposal of public property, including any interest therein, for private
purposes;
(11) vacation of roads;
(12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private corporation;
(13) effectuation of invalid deeds, wills or other instruments, or change in
the law of descent;
(14) change of name of any person;
(15) divorce;
(16) legitimation or adoption of persons;
(17) relief of minors from legal disabilities;
(18) transfer of any property interest of persons under legal disabilities or
of estates of decedents;
(19) hunting or fresh water fishing;
(20) regulation of occupations which are regulated by a state agency; or
(21) any subject when prohibited by general law passed by a three-fifths
vote of the membership of each house. Such law may be amended or repealed by
like vote.
(b) In the enactment of general laws on other subjects, political subdivi-
sions or other governmental entities may be classified only on a basis reasonably
related to the subject of the law.
265. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a)(1). Where the filing fee for an election of a school
board member was measured by a percentage of the salary to be paid, and a statute reduced
the salary of board members, any effect on election "is so incidental and tenuous as not to
be cognizable by the prohibition." School Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So. 2d 834,
839 (Fla. 1977).
266. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a)(1). Only when the purpose of the special act is to
usurp the jurisdiction or duties of officers is the statute unconstitutional. If the act has a
valid purpose and only incidentally affects such duties, it is constitutional. Pinellas County
Planning Council v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Fla. 1978) (upholding creation of county-
wide land use plan where each municipality held planning power for its own area). Accord,
Furnams v. Santa Rosa Island Auth., 377 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
A statute creating civil service for deputy sheriffs does not unconstitutionally restrict
the duties of the sheriff, although it may prevent his termination of the deputies' services.
Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1979).
Section 11(a)(1) provides an exception for local government agencies. A sheriff is con-
sidered an agency for the purpose of this exception. Escambia County Sheriff's Dep't v.
Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, 376 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
267. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a)(2). See Wernle v. Bellemead Dev. Corp., 308 So. 2d 97
(Fla. 1975) (statutes cancelling tax certificates not special laws regulating assessment or col-
lection of taxes).
268. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11(a)(10). In Furnams v. Santa Rosa Island Auth., 377 So.





Executive power vests in the governor, who must see that the
laws are faithfully executed.2 6 ' If he thinks the ends of justice will
be served, the governor may assign any state attorney to discharge
the appropriate duties in any circuit of the state.2 70
The Department of Criminal Law Enforcement Act of 1974271
authorizes the governor by written order to empower the Division
of Criminal Investigation to investigate violations of the criminal
laws of the state, bear arms, make arrests, and secure, serve, and
execute search and arrest warrants.27 2 In Thompson v. State,"3 the
executive order 274 authorizing the investigation of violations of
criminal laws and official misconduct was challenged because no
rules had been promulgated delineating the procedures necessary
to conduct such investigations. The supreme court held that no
preliminary regulations are necessary, since the governor is free to
act in the "normal, constitutional way. 2 75 The court also rejected
a separation of powers argument,276 because the Act gave the exec-
utive no more discretion than that already conferred by the consti-
tution. The Act merely assisted the governor in marshalling re-
sources to carry out the executive function of law enforcement.2 7
B. Advisory Opinions
The governor may request an advisory opinion from the su-
preme court, interpreting the constitution on any question affect-
ing his executive powers and duties.17  The governor used this
power to determine whether he was authorized to fill a vacancy in
lease island property owned by Escambia County did not violate § 11(a)(10). Although the
lease was for private development, the anticipated recreational, residential, and business
uses were deemed to be in the public interest and, therefore, in compliance with the deed
vesting title in the county. Id. at 987.
269. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a).
270. Austin v. Christina, 310 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1975); see FLA. STAT. § 27.14 (1979).
271. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.01-.465 (1979).
272. Id. § 943.04(2)(a) (1979).
273. 342 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1976).
274. Exec. Order No. 74-38, cited in 342 So. 2d at 54.
275. 342 So. 2d at 55.
276. Appellant claimed that the statute delegated legislative power by giving unlimited
discretion to the governor. Id.; see notes 355-61 and accompanying text infra.
277. 342 So. 2d at 55.
278. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c).
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the tax collector's office of a home rule charter county. 17 The su-
preme court held that although article VIII, section 1(d) provides
that county officers may be selected by means other than election
when provided by county charter, this provision does not address
the filling of vacancies. Article IV, section 1(f) controls, authorizing
the governor to fill the vacancy.280
The question of the governor's authority to fill vacancies also
arose in connection with the creation of judicial vacancies. 81 Pur-
suant to article V, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, the su-
preme court had certified to the legislature the need for increasing
the number of judges and for redefining appellate districts.28 2 In
response, the legislature enacted a bill which altered the recom-
mendations of the supreme court,2 83 and the governor sought the
opinion of the court on whether the legislation constitutionally cre-
ated judicial vacancies that would permit gubernatorial appoint-
ments.24 Although four justices of the supreme court285 deter-
mined that this request came properly within the purview of
article IV, section 1(c) as directly affecting the governor's duty,
three justices2ac argued that the court should decline to answer the
governor's request. Chief Justice England and Justice Hatchett
viewed the issue as the questionable constitutionality of the stat-
ute and asserted that the court could declare legislative acts
invalid only in proceedings in which both sides of the issue have
been carefully framed and presented.8 7 Not only was the advisory
opinion nonadversarial, but the governor had neither suggested
any basis for questioning the statute nor argued his position on the
issues. 288 Justice Sundberg emphasized the necessity of a proper
279. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, Request of Feb. 25, 1975, 313 So. 2d 717
(Fla. 1975). See the discussion of home rule in text accompanying note 438 infra.
280. Id. at 721. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(f) provides:
When not otherwise provided for in this constitution, the governor shall fill by
appointment any vacancy in state or county office for the remainder of the term
of an appointive office, and for the remainder of the term of an elective office if
less than twenty-eight months, otherwise until the first Tuesday after the first
Monday following the next general election.
281. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, Request of June 29, 1979, 374 So. 2d 959
(Fla. 1979).
282. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
283. 374 So. 2d at 961.
284. Id. at 962. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11 confers on the governor the duty of filling
vacancies in judicial office.
285. Adkins, Boyd, Overton, Alderman, JJ.
286. England, Hatchett, Sundberg, JJ.




regard for separation of powers among the coordinate branches of
government and agreed with the other dissenting justices that the
court must not indiscriminately pass upon the constitutional valid-
ity of executive or legislative acts through an advisory opinion. 89
Despite the "extreme importance and urgency" 90 of the question
of the validity of the legislation, three of the seven justices opined
that an advisory opinion does not provide a proper vehicle for de-
termining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
C. Suspension of Officers
The governor has the power in appropriate circumstances to
suspend state, county, and municipal officers.2 91 In In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, Request of July 12, 1976,22 the governor
sought clarification of his power to suspend the mayor of the Con-
solidated City of Jacksonville, who had been indicted by the grand
jury for commission of a felony and two misdemeanors. The ques-
tion turned on whether the mayor was to be treated as a county
officer2 9 3 or as a municipal officer.2 " The supreme court answered
that the governor had power to remove the mayor only as a county
officer, and only if a constitutional ground for removal existed. The
court examined the Jacksonville charter,295 determining that the
289. Id. at 972. See notes 339-71 and accompanying text infra.
290. Id. at 967 (Boyd, J., concurring).
291. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a), (c).
Once the governor has issued a suspension order, the correct standard of review to test
its legal sufficiency is whether it contains facts that bear a reasonable relation to the charge.
Bass v. Askew, 342 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
292. 336 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1976).
293. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a) provides:
By executive order stating the grounds and filed with the secretary of state, the
governor may suspend from office any state officer not subject to impeachment,
any officer of the militia not in the active service of the United States, or any
county officer, for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, in-
competence, permanent inability to perform his official duties, or commission of
a felony, and may fill the office by appointment for the period of suspension.
The suspended officer may at any time before removal be reinstated by the
governor.
(Emphasis added.)
294. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(c) provides: "By order of the governor any elected munici-
pal officer indicted for crime may be suspended from office until acquitted and the office
filled by appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term, unless
these powers are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal charter" (emphasis added). But
see Johnson v. Johansen, 338 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (city council has power to
remove its president in accordance with procedure established by ordinance enacted after
proscribed conduct occurred).
295. FLA. STAT. § 112.49 (1979).
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mayor of consolidated Jacksonville had "the powers and duties of a
county officer"29 and should be treated as such for the purpose of
suspension.297
D. Clemency Power
The clemency power, vested exclusively in the executive
branch, 98 flows from the constitution and not from any legisla-
tion.299 Should the legislature attempt to exercise or control any
part of the pardoning power, it would violate separation of pow-
ers, 300 since the executive has unrestricted discretion in exercising
his power. 30 1 For this reason, the procedures mandated in the Flor-
ida Administrative Procedure Act 30 2 are explicitly inapplicable to
the exercise of any gubernatorial power "derived" from the Florida
Constitution. 3 Certain grants of pardon by the governor require
"the approval of three members of the cabinet." 304 Although the
Act does not expressly exempt these cabinet actions, the supreme
court has opined that they too are beyond its scope. 306
The prohibition against encroachment on the executive branch
also extends to the judiciary. In Sullivan v. Askew,30 three persons
convicted of capital felonies and sentenced to death alleged that
296. 336 So. 2d at 99.
297. Id. Because the legislature has the power to create, alter, or abolish municipalities,
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a), it also has the power to define a municipality and a county for
suspension purposes. Id.
298. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8 provides:
(a) Except in cases of treason and in cases where impeachment results in con-
viction, the governor may, by executive order filed with the secretary of state,
suspend collection of fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves not exceeding sixty
days and, with the approval of three members of the cabinet, grant full or condi-
tional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and
forfeitures for offenses.
(b) In cases of treason the governor may grant reprieves until adjournment of
the regular session of the legislature convening next after the conviction, at
which session the legislature may grant a pardon or further reprieve; otherwise
the sentence shall be executed.
299. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. 1977).
300. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; see notes 326-71 and accompanying text infra.
301. 348 So. 2d at 315-16.
302. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.73 (1979).
303. Id. § 120.52(1)(a) (1979).
304. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
305. In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, In re Administrative Procedure Act, Ex-
ecutive Clemency, 334 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1976). Justice England concurred with the majority
only insofar as the opinion dealt with the constitutional powers of the governor, but found
the advisory opinion concerning the cabinet members to be unauthorized. Id. at 563.
306. 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1977).
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the executive, in considering requests for clemency, had not met
minimal due process standards, which would include "a fair and
impartial tribunal, the right to be heard in person and by counsel,
and written standards or guidelines setting forth factors to be con-
sidered in granting clemency. ' 807 The supreme court held that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, reasoning that the clem-
ency powers are totally discretionary with the executive and that
the procedures adopted were in accord with the specific constitu-
tional grant, not "imposing constitutionally objectionable
conditions."308
The determination of maximum and minimum sentences for
violations of the law is a legislative function.30' The creation of a
minimum sentence is not a legislative encroachment on executive
authority,310 but is the exercise of a power expressly reserved to
the legislature in the creation of the Parole and Probation Com-
mission. " ' It does not usurp parole authority, a function of the ex-
ecutive. If a sentence imposed is within the limitations set by the
legislature, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere, but reevalua-
tion of a sentence may be requested of the governor under article
IV, section 8.312
E. Attorney General
The attorney general is the chief legal officer of the state.81 In
307. Id. at 313.
308. Id. at 316. But Justice England, concurring, distinguished the "traditional" pardon
power of the executive, exercised without consultation or official procedure for whomever
and however the executive wishes, from the death sentence review process, which operates
in the same way as any other administrative process in Florida, requiring hearings, an infor-
mal evidentiary proceeding, reports, and a public explanation of the decision, all within
specific time frames. Id. at 318. Once the executive creates agency procedures purporting to
establish minimum due process, the clemency power is no longer exclusively constitutionally
derived and the judiciary may review the process for fundamental fairness. In this case,
however, Justice England concluded that the proper standard had been met.
309. Dorminey v. State, 314 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 1975).
310. Id.; Owens v. State, 316 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1975).
311. FLA. STAT. § 947.16(1) (1979); FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c) provides:
There may be created by law a parole and probation commission with power to
supervise persons on probation and to grant paroles or conditional releases to
persons under sentences for crime. The qualifications, method of selection and
terms, not to exceed six years, of members of the commission shall be prescribed
by law.
This section creates a legislative power in the article dealing with the executive. It is a
functional placement of powers similar to the conferring of executive powers in article V, §
11 (judicial article) and article III, § 8 (legislative article). See 316 So. 2d at 538 n.4.
312. Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469, 470 (Fla. 1976).
313. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(c).
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Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,1 the State of Florida, through the attor-
ney general, had commenced an antitrust action in federal court
against seventeen major oil companies. One of the preliminary
questions raised by the companies was the right of the attorney
general to bring an action under federal law without authorization
from the agencies, departments, and political subdivisions to which
the damages actually accrued. 15 The Fifth Circuit refused to cer-
tify the question to the Supreme Court of Florida, finding suffi-
cient Florida law upon which to draw. The court held that not only
is the attorney general a constitutional officer, but he has common
law as well as statutory powers.316 Included among his common law
powers is the duty to "prosecute all actions necessary for the pro-
tection and defense of the property and the revenue of the
state.'"1 7 The court equated the institution of an action with the
prosecution of it," 8 and found that this power was not limited to
actions in quo warranto or under state law. The statutory delega-
tion of specific portions of the litigation power to state attorneys
did not abrogate the attorney general's common law powers in
other types of litigation. "[Tihose powers still obtain in the ab-
sence of express legislative provision to the contrary."31 9
F. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
The Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission was created by
article IV, section 9, of the Florida Constitution to "exercise the
regulatory and executive powers of the state with respect to wild
animal life and fresh water aquatic life."320 Reserved to the legisla-
314. 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
315. Id. at 267.
316. Id. at 269.
317. Id. at 271 (quoting Landis v. Kress, 115 Fla. 189, 200, 155 So. 823, 827 (1934)).
318. 526 F.2d at 270 n.16.
319. Id. at 273.
320. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9, as amended in 1974, provides:
There shall be a game and fresh water fish commission, composed of five mem-
bers appointed by the governor subject to confirmation by the senate for stag-
gered terms of five years. The commission shall exercise the regulatory and exec-
utive powers of the state with respect to wild animal life and fresh water aquatic
life, except that all license fees for taking wild animal life and fresh water
aquatic life and penalties for violating regulations of the commission shall be
prescribed by specific statute. The legislature may enact laws in aid of the com-
mission, not inconsistent with this section. The commission's exercise of execu-
tive powers in the area of planning, budgeting, personnel management, and
purchasing shall be as provided by law. Revenue derived from such license fees
shall be appropriated to the commission by the legislature for the purpose of
management, protection and conservation of wild animal life and fresh water
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ture is the power to enact laws determining license fees for hunting
and fishing, penalties for violating Commission regulations, laws in
aid of the Commission, and provisions for the exercise of executive
power by the Commission in the area of planning, budgeting, per-
sonnel management, and purchasing.2 1 In Department of Natural
Resources v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission,82 2 the
Commission challenged a statute which transferred to the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources the authority to review, supervise, and
approve the Commission's exercise of executive power in the area
of budgeting.2M The Supreme Court of Florida found that statute
unconstitutional because it totally undermined the constitutional
grant of executive power to the Commission. 24 Where a statute
ostensibly conflicts with the Commission's authority under article
IV, section 9, but is supported by another article of the constitu-
tion, the two sections must be read together to determine the va-
lidity of the law.
25
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Florida Constitution is more explicit in its prohibition of
delegation than is the Constitution of the United States or those of
many other states. Not only does article II, section 3 expressly
limit the authority of one branch to exercise any powers pertaining
to either of the other branches, M but this provision continuously
aquatic life.
321. Id.
322. 342 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1977).
323. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-22, § 17 (amending FLA. STAT. § 20.25(17) (1973)).
324. 342 So. 2d at 497. The court reserved the question of whether the legislature may
not pass any law diminishing the Commission's budgetary autonomy. Id.
325. In Askew v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 336 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1976), the
supreme court upheld several statutes that collectively allowed the Department of Natural
Resources, without obtaining a permit from the Commission, to introduce fish in Florida
waters to control aquatic weeds. The court examined not only former article IV, § 9, which
confers all "non-judicial powers of the state" on the commission, but also article II, § 7,
which declares state environmental policy: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve
and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by
law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise." If
the statutes were invalidated, the legislature would have no power to carry out the policy
announced in article II, § 7. Therefore, the court construed the two sections together to
uphold the statutes. Id. at 560.
326. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly pro-
vided herein."
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and consistently has been strictly construed. 27
A. Legislature v. Executive
The legislature, elected by the people and representing their
interests, must establish fundamental policy decisions in the law
and create standards and guidelines sufficiently specific to help di-
rect the agency in its execution of the powers delegated.128 Delega-
tion without standards enforceable by the judiciary against an
agency violates separation of powers because it effectively places
the lawmaking power in the hands of the executive. In Florida
Home Builders Association v. Division of Labor,s29 the supreme
court invalidated section 446.071 of the Florida Statutes. The stat-
ute assigned to the agency the duty to accept or reject applications
for an apprenticeship program according to "need." Because no
standards or policies for ascertaining "need" existed either in this
law or in other statutes dealing with apprenticeship, the courts
would be unable to determine if the agency was implementing leg-
islative intent, or unconstitutionally exercising the lawmaking
power.330
In response to the constitutional expression of state policy to
conserve and protect the natural resources and scenic beauty of
the state," 1 the legislature passed the "Florida Environmental
Land and Water Management Act. 33 2 The enactment empowered
the Division of State Planning to recommend areas of critical state
concern to the governor and the cabinet, who act as the Adminis-
tration Commission. 33 In Askew v. Cross Keys Waterways, 4 the
supreme court held that the determination of which geographical
327. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978). Although other
states have limiting provisions similar to article II, § 3, some have abandoned a strict dele-
gation doctrine in favor of the federally followed view enunciated by Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis of the University of Chicago College of Law. This view, representing the modern
trend in administrative law, shifts the emphasis from legislatively imposed standards for
administrative action to procedural safeguards in the administrative process itself. Id. at
922, 924; see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 2.04, at 30 (1976).
328. 372 So. 2d at 925.
329. 367 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1979).
330. Id. at 220. For a discussion of cases invalidating statutes under the delegation doc-
trine of article III, § 1, see notes 236-45 and accompanying text supra.
0331. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7; see note 325 supra.
332. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-317 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (Supp. 1972)).
333. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(1)(a) (1977) (held unconstitutional in Askew v. Cross Keys
Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978)). The defective section was amended in 1979 to pro-
vide for legislative review of agency recommendations, based on more specific criteria. 1979
Fla. Laws ch. 79-73, § 4.
334. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
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areas and resources need the greatest protection is a basic policy
decision and, therefore, is a legislative task that cannot be dele-
gated to the Commission, despite criteria enumerated in the stat-
ute to guide the decision.335 Because the criteria failed to docu-
ment legislative priorities among competing factors and resources
for preservation, the Act was unconstitutional.336
The Government in the Sunshine Law"" mandates that meet-
ings of boards, commissions, and agencies of state and local gov-
ernments be open to the public. In Kanner v. Frumpkes"' the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, determined that this
mandate does not apply to the Judicial Nominating Commission.
The function of the Commission in screening judicial applicants is
an inherently executive function that may not be limited by legis-
lative act.
B. Legislature v. Judiciary
In the same way that the principle of the separation of powers
forbids the legislature to delegate its powers to another branch, the
principle precludes the legislature from enacting statutes that en-
croach on powers committed to another branch. The supreme
court invalidated a provision of the medical mediation statute3 9
which stated that after mediation a trial on the merits would be
conducted without "reference" to insurance.3 40 "References" were
held to be purely procedural and, therefore, within the constitu-
tional power of the supreme court to adopt rules for practice and
procedure in all courts. 841 The court, however, recognized the wis-
dom of the policy expressed in the statute and adopted the sub-
stance of the unconstitutional section as a rule of procedure.
342
335. Id. at 919.
336. Id. The court held that the doctrine of nondelegation under arti cle II, section 3
required rejection of the Davis view of administrative law. Id. at 924-25; see note 327 supra.
337. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1979).
338. 353 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
339. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-9, § 5 (codified, as amended, at FLA. STAT. §§ 768.44, .47
(1979)) (held unconstitutional in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980)).
340. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977).
341. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). See Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978)
(invalidating statute that had regulated joinder of motor vehicle liability insurers, as an
unconstitutional encroachment on the rulemaking power); see notes 30-44 and accompany-
ing text supra.
342. 335 So. 2d at 806. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(e) provides: "In any civil medical malprac-
tice action, the trial on the merits shall be conducted without any reference to insurance, to
insurance coverage, or to the joinder of an insurer as co-defendant in the suit."
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If the subject matter of a proposal is substantive, the legisla-
ture may act on it. In Johnson v. State,33 the District Court of
Appeal, First District, rejected the argument that presentence in-
vestigation is substantive, because the supreme court, in promul-
gating Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710,3 1 had already de-




requiring presentence reports in conflict with the rule, which
granted discretion concerning such reports, violated the separation
of powers. "A rule of procedure promulgated and adopted by the
Supreme Court of Florida cannot be amended or superseded by an
act of legislature.
''3 4 6
The court cannot usurp the legislative function. In Brown v.
State, 47 the supreme court refused, on separation of powers
grounds, to give a limiting construction to a statute outlawing open
profanity, 48 since no such limited legislative intent could be found
in the language of the statute. The statute, therefore, was declared
unconstitutional as punishing pure speech.-
4 9
In seeming opposition to strict interpretations of the separa-
tion of powers is the doctrine of inherent powers. The answer to a
certified question in Rose v. Palm Beach Countys" determined
that a trial court has inherent power " ' to order that indigent wit-
nesses be paid in advance for traveling and lodging expenses in
excess of the statutory maximum to ensure a criminal defendant a
fair trial.352 The court held that where fundamental rights are at
issue, the judiciary cannot abdicate its responsibility and defer to
343. 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), affd, 346 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam);
see notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
344. "In all cases in which the court has discretion as to what sentence may be im-
posed, the court may refer the case to the probation and parole commission for investigation
and recommendation" (emphasis added).
345. FLA. STAT. § 921.231 (1975).
346. 308 So. 2d at 129. The legislature, however, has the power to make rules of proce-
dure promulgated by the supreme court applicable to administrative proceedings. State
Dep't of Highway Safety v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 322 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 18t DCA 1975).
347. 358 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1978).
348. FLA. STAT. § 847.04 (1975).
349. 358 So. 2d at 21. By narrowly construing the statute to accord with the first
amendment, the court could have saved the statute.
350. 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
351. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
352. The petition for an order compelling higher payment was granted by the trial
judge, after a successful motion for change of venue in a criminal prosecution had required
state and defense witnesses, many of them indigent, to travel approximately 300 miles. 361
So. 2d at 136.
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legislative decisions.311 Finding inherent power to be derived from
and essential to the separation of powers and judicial independ-
ence, the court interpreted its inherent powers as a corollary of,
rather than in derogation of, separation of powers.85'
C. Judiciary v. Executive
In Sullivan v. Askew,"' convicted felons who had been sen-
tenced to death challenged clemency proceedings as being violative
of due process. The supreme court held that it Would violate the
separation of powers for the court to examine the pardon power,
since it exists solely at the unrestricted and unlimited discretion of
the governor. 56
In a decision important for attorneys, Ciravolo v. Florida
Bar,357 the supreme court clarified a confused series of cases and
held that a grant of transactional immunity by an assistant state
attorney to an attorney who agreed to testify in a criminal case
does not extend to disciplinary proceedings by the Florida Bar.
The immunity statute expressly immunizes the party from any
"penalty or forfeiture,"8 58 which would seem to include disciplinary
proceedings by a professional organization. The court, however,
held the immunity from Florida Bar proceedings ineffective, on the
basis that the regulation of admission and discipline of attorneys
falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the supreme court,8 and
other branches have no power to act in this area.360 Disciplinary
immunity is obtained solely by application to the supreme court,
whose decisions to grant immunity are determined by whether the
greater good of society will thereby be served. 61
353. 361 So. 2d at 137.
354. Id.
355. 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977); see notes 306-08 and ac-
companying text supra.
356. Justice England concurred but asserted that where the procedure established oper-
ates in the same way as other administrative processes, it is the job of the judiciary to see
that due process requirements are met. 348 So. 2d at 318. He concurred after finding that
the procedure used complied with due process.
357. 361 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1978).
358. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1979).
359. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15. See notes 182-86 and accompanying text supra.
360. In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975); see note 373 infra.
361. 361 So. 2d at 125. The court did not apply the holding to the petitioners before the
court on the basis that they had relied on the broad language in Lurie v. Florida State Bd.
of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973), in which the court made explicit reference to attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings as being within the grant of immunity. The court, in the in-
stant case, limited the application of Lurie to areas other than the discipline of attorneys.
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D. Exceptions
Separation of powers, however, is not absolute .3  The division
of governmental powers is intended for practical purposes, and not
every governmental activity belongs exclusively to one branch. " '
The Uniform Disposition of Traffic Infractions Act,364 which estab-
lished an informal hearing process for considering minor traffic in-
fractions, was upheld in State v. Johnson.158 The supreme court
stated that the duties placed upon the judge in conducting a traffic
hearing, while including investigative as well as judicial activity,
are essentially administrative and not violative of separation of
powers.5 "6
In Department of Environmental Regulation v. Leon
County,3 67 petitioners contended that the power of a hearing officer
of the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine the consti-
tutionality of proposed rules in furtherance of administrative
rulemaking was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
and an exercise of judicial power. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, reiterated its holding in State Department of Ad-
ministration v. Stevens"6 that the legislature may legally vest
quasi-judicial power in a hearing officer under chapter 120 of the
Florida Statutes.309 This power includes the determination of
"whether or not a proposed rule violates the Florida Constitution
if adopted, such determination being subject to judicial review.
37 0
Once the rule is passed, its constitutionality is a question for the
courts alone. The First District also denied petitioner's contention
that the statute permitting a hearing officer to declare certain rules
void unlawfully vested in that officer the legislative power to make
rules for all agencies. The court found that the legislature had
merely established a check on the rulemaking authority of other
agencies in a specialized agency to assure compliance with author-
362. State v. Johnson, 345 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1977).
363. Id.
364. FLA. STAT. §§ 318.11-.22 (1979).
365. 345 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1977).
366. Id. at 1071.
367. 344 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Florida Educ. Ass'n v. Public Em-
ployees Relations Comm'n, 346 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
368. 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
369. Florida Administrative Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(14), .56, .68 (1979).
370. 344 So. 2d at 298 (emphasis in original). In 4245 Corp. v. Division of Beverage, 348
So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the court held that judicial review of a ruling on a proposed
rule by the Division of Administrative Hearings does not violate FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, but




ity granted by the legislature. 7 1
VI. ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
Following several political scandals in Florida in the seven-
ties, 72 certain officials, employees, and candidates for office were
required to file statements of their financial interests, which state-
ments became "public records. ' ' 73 No specific dollar amount was
required. A successful drive to amend the constitution by popular
initiative '7 resulted in passage of the "Sunshine Amendment" in
1976, seeking to ensure ethics in government and placing stricter
controls on conflicts of interests. The amendment is now article II,
section 8 of the Florida Constitution. It requires "full and public
disclosure of financial interests," showing net worth and identify-
ing each asset and liability in excess of $1,000 together with the
most recent income tax return or a sworn statement specifying
each separate source and amount of income exceeding $1,000. 875
In Plante v. Gonzalez, 76 the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, upheld the amendment in a federal constitutional
challenge. Five state senators claimed that personal financial dis-
closure violated their rights to privacy. 77 The court held that
371. 344 So. 2d at 299.
372. Florida's Controller, Treasurer, and Superintendent of Education were in-
dicted for selling their influence. A legislative committee recommended that one
state supreme court justice be impeached for similar activities. A second justice
resigned under fire. A third supreme court justice was reprimanded by the state
body supervising judicial conduct. N.Y. Times, April 27, 1975, at 35, col. 1. In
1976, U.S. Representative Robert L. F. Sikes was reprimanded by the House of
Representatives because as Chairman of the House Appropriations subcommit-
tee on military construction he had helped pass legislation and secured govern-
ment decisions from which he benefited financially. United States Senator Ed-
ward Gurney was acquitted of federal charges stemming from alleged influence
peddling. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1974, at 10, col. 1; October 28, 1976, at 19, col. 1.
Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1122 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).
373. FLA. STAT. § 112.3145 (1979) (originally enacted as 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-177, § 5).
In In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975), the supreme court ruled that this law did not
apply to judicial officers. Candidates for judicial positions must meet legislative require-
ments, but members of the bar as judicial officers are amenable only to supreme court regu-
lation. The standards for disclosure enunciated in the Canons of Ethics differ from those of
the statute. Id. at 46, 47; see notes 194-95 and accompanying text supra.
374. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
375. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(a), (h)(1). Although the filing date established is July 1 of
each year, the supreme court construed that date as applying only to office holders. Candi-
dates for elective office must file disclosure statements before or at the time they qualify.
Failure to file a disclosure statement constitutes a defect in the candidate's filing papers.
Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1979).
376. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
377. "Americans have a constitutional right to privacy. The right springs from several
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financial privacy does not lie within the individual autonomy
branch of the constitutional right of privacy,378 and that financial
disclosure did not violate the public officials' right to
confidentiality.
e79
The Florida Commission of Ethics, an independent commis-
sion, was created and authorized to investigate and make public
reports on complaints concerning breach of the public trust.380 The
supreme court concluded that this authority includes the power to
file with the secretary of state or to publicly distribute a report
stating the Commission's conclusions concerning an alleged breach
of trust by a state legislator. 81 Such a report may not be transmit-
ted to the president of the senate in an effort to initiate discipli-
nary action against a senator, 82 and it is not binding on the legis-
lature,38 3  which has the exclusive power to discipline its
members.38'
Although the disclosure requirement has gained the most pub-
licity, the "Sunshine Amendment" also attempted to provide
means to ensure ethical government. Under the amendment, any
public officer or employee convicted of a felony involving a breach
of public trust is subject to forfeiture of pension or public retire-
ment rights "as may be provided by law." '385
Article II, section 8(e) attempts to prevent influence peddling.
of the Bill of Rights amendments, and is incorporated in the due process protected by the
fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1127 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
378. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977), the United States Supreme Court
characterized privacy as having two strands: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" (confidentiality-an external strand) and the "interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions" (autonomy-an internal strand).
379. The court balanced the senators' financial privacy against the state interest in dis-
closure, including the public's right to know, creation of confidence in officials, deterrence of
corruption and conflict of interest, and aid in finding and prosecuting officials who have
violated the law. 575 F.2d at 1134. Since the officials had chosen to run for office, their
expectations of privacy are necessarily limited. The court found that the state interests out-
weighed those of the senators.
380. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(f), (h)(3). In Isley v. Askew, 358 So. 2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978), the court held that this provision incorporated the appointment procedure enunci-
ated in FLA. STAT. § 112.320 (1975) for members of the commission.
381. Florida Comm'n on Ethics v. Plante, 369 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1979); see FLA. STAT. §
112.324 (1979) (enabling legislation does not delegate the right to advise disciplinary action
against legislators although giving broad powers against other officers).
382. 369 So. 2d at 335.
383. Id. at 337.
384. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 4(d); see FLA. STAT. § 112.322 (1979).
385. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); see Williams v. Smith, 360 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1978) (provi-
sion not self-executing; legislature must implement). At the end of 1979 there was still no
enabling statute authorizing such forfeiture.
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Members of the legislature are prohibited from personally repre-
senting another person or entity for compensation during their
terms of office before any state agency other than judicial tribu-
nals.3 86 The appropriate test for determining whether an agency
has judicial characteristics, for purposes of equating it with a judi-
cial tribunal, is the "predominant characteristics" test.38 7 The
agency itself is not to apply the test; rather, the court is.35 s
In accordance with the goal of ethics in government, the con-
stitution mandates the adoption of a code of ethics for public of-
ficers and employees.3 89 The legislature has enacted the Code of




The constitution establishes counties as the subdivisions of
the state. 9' This status carries with it the sovereign immunity of
the state unless the legislature provides otherwise by general
law. 2 Any monies paid to satisfy a judgment against a county will
come from the state treasury, because "[u]nlike a municipality, a
county has no corporate fund or other proprietary holding."3 93
386. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(e). This section also prohibits all statewide elected officers,
as well as members of the legislature, from representing "another person or entity for com-
pensation before the government body or agency of which the individual was an officer or
member for a period of two years following vacation of office."
387. Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 931-32 (Fla. 1978). The test would eliminate
those agencies, such as the Public Service Commission, which possess judicial characteristics
for only some, rather than virtually all, their activities. Id. at 931.
388. 362 So. 2d at 929.
389. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
390. 1967 Fla. Laws ch. 67-469 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 112.311-.326 (1979)). For two
cases holding sections of the statute unconstitutionally vague, see State v. Rou, 366 So. 2d
385 (Fla. 1978) (the phrase "special privileges or exemptions" affords no guidance);
D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1977) (holding unconstitutionally vague the
clause: "that would cause a reasonably prudent person to be influenced in the discharge of
official duties").
See also In re Florida Bar, 316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975) (Ethics Code not applicable to
judicial officers), discussed in note 373 supra.
391. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a).
392. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143, 147 (Fla. 1978) (no
authority for money judgment against county because of prior dual taxation); see note 484
infra. See also Circuit Court v. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.
1976) (sovereign immunity applies to state agencies except as waived by constitution or
statute).
393. 339 So. 2d at 1115-16.
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County government may be established by charter"9 4 or by act
of the legislature. 95 Non-charter counties have only such power as
provided by general or special law."' In Townley v. Marion
County,3 97 the Board of Commissioners of a non-charter county en-
acted an ordinance whereby previous zoning regulations, promul-
gated pursuant to special acts of the legislature, were subsequently
extended from specifically limited unincorporated areas to the en-
tire unincorporated area of Marion County. Although given the
zoning power by general law,398 the county had failed to follow the
statutory mechanism provided for the adoption of zoning regula-
tions."99 The ordinance was therefore invalid because it was incon-
sistent with the grant of power under the general law. 00
When a county becomes a charter county,40 it has all the pow-
ers of local self-government and may enact county ordinances not
inconsistent with general law.402 This power includes the power to
establish municipal services districts and to levy ad valorem taxes
in that district.
03
No county, however, may tax property located within munici-
palities for services that the county rendered "exclusively" for the
benefit of property or residents in unincorporated areas.' 04 In Als-
394. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c).
395. Id. § 1(a).
396. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f) with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). Although
non-charter counties have only such powers of self-government as expressly provided by the
state legislature in general or special laws, charter counties possess all powers of local self-
government not inconsistent with general legislative enactments or with special laws that
have been approved by the electorate.
397. 343 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1978).
398. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(h) (1979) provides that to the extent not inconsistent with
general or special law, the power to carry on county government includes the power to
"Ie]stablish, coordinate, and enforce zoning and such business regulations as are necessary
for the protection of the public."
399. FLA. STAT. § 163.165 (1979) provides minimum requirements for exercising the
general grant of zoning power, such as a comprehensive general plan and provisions for
annual review.
400. The court opined that the two general statutes were "supplemental and in addi-
tion to" such other zoning powers as might be exercised by a charter county or pursuant to
a special law. 343 So. 2d at 1313-14. In contrast, by acting inconsistently with the terms of
the general grant, Marion County was without power to adopt the ordinance.
401. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c) provides: "Pursuant to general or special law, a county
government may be established by charter which shall be adopted, amended or repealed
only upon vote of the electors of the county in a special election called for that purpose."
402. Id. § 1(g); see note 396 supra.
403. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v. County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44, 44-45 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977); see notes 477-87 and accompanying text infra.
404. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(h).
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dorf v. Broward County,40 5 the supreme court held that this provi-
sion of the constitution is self-executing. The court rejected a lit-
eral reading of the word "exclusively"' 06 as eliminating all meaning
from the provision, because every expenditure may have some min-
iscule effect on municipal residents.07 Despite the effect on the
fiscal stability of a large metropolitan county, property within a
municipality cannot be taxed for expenditures of "no real or sub-
stantial benefit to municipal residents.' ' 8
Yet this provision limits only the power of the county to levy
and collect property taxes.4 ' The supreme court has suggested
that counties may use revenues not derived from property taxes for
the benefit of unincorporated areas alone, despite any imbalance in
benefits received that might be created.410 Franchise fees paid by a
utility to a county for the grant of a franchise are not taxes and
hence are not subject to the prohibition. 11 If a county has improp-
erly taxed the property of a municipality, the legislature may enact
laws that offer the municipality relief. Although such relief may
not take the form of a money judgment assessed for prior years'
violations,"2 the court may provide relief to be enforced against
the counties in the future."8 Of course, a county may regulate cer-
tain municipal services in matters affecting the whole county. 4"4
The state anticipates more efficient management of municipal sys-
tems on a metropolitan basis.
In general, the power to regulate occupations and businesses
by franchise is an attribute of state sovereignty that a county may
not attempt to exercise without state enabling legislation. In
Cable- Vision, Inc. v. Freeman,"4 5 a non-charter county gave Cable-
Vision an exclusive franchise for television reception in the area.
The legislature then ratified only the right to a nonexclusive
405. 333 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1976).
406. Id. at 460.
407. Id. at 459 n.8.
408. Id. at 460.
409. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 1978).
410. Id. at 148. The court said that the legislature must determine if any such imbal-
ance must be corrected.
411. City of Hialeah Gardens v. Dade County, 348 So. 2d 1174, 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977), appeal dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1978), cited in 365 So. 2d at 146.
412. 365 So. 2d at 147.
413. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 125.01(6) (1979).
414. City of North Miami Beach v. Metropolitan Dade County, 317 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1975) (municipal water plants).
415. 324 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), appeal dismissed, 336 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.
1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1032 (1977) (no substantial federal question).
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franchise. When the county later issued a franchise to a second
company providing an alternative means of television transmission
in the area, the court upheld the second franchise as a valid exer-
cise of county power as provided by statute.41 The attempt by the
county to create an exclusive franchise without legislative authori-
zation was ultra vires.
17
The governing body of each county, unless otherwise provided
in the county charter, shall be a board of five commissioners.""
After each decennial census the board must divide the county into
districts "as nearly equal in population as practicable," and one
commissioner residing in each district is to be elected by the elec-
tors of the county."" In Flagler County Board of Commissioners v.
Likins," 0 electors sought reapportionment of county districts,
claiming inequality in population and challenging the statute
which provided for boundary changes only in odd number years.421
The court found that because county commissioners run at large,
they represent all electors, although one lives in each district.
Therefore, no fourteenth amendment violation existed. Further-
more, the supreme court held that it was reasonable for the board
to redistrict only every two years, unless the apportionment plan
discriminated against a particular group, by minimizing or elimi-
nating voting strength by race or political party.
The state constitution requires the "just valuation" of prop-
erty for taxation purposes.4 2 2 This requirement is violated if tax
assessments are greater than one hundred percent of the fair mar-
ket value of the property or are unequally or improperly deter-
mined with respect to similar property in the same county.", But
different assessments for adjacent similar properties in different
416. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(l)(f) (1979) gives the county power to provide "recreational
and cultural facilities and programs." Subsection (1)(w) dictates that any programs must be
in the common interest of the people of the county. The court in Cable-Vision held that a
valid county purpose was served in providing alternative means of television reception, since
the franchise granted to Cable-Vision did not result in adequate transmission to the citizens
of the area.
417. 324 So. 2d at 152.
418. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); see notes 291-97 and accompanying text supra, dis-
cussing the governor's power to suspend a county officer under FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
419. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(e).
420. 337 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1976).
421. FLA. STAT. § 124.01(3) (1979).
422. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 provides: "By general law regulations shall be prescribed
which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation .... "
423. Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc., 360 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1978); see notes 508-14
and accompanying text infra.
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counties are permissible, and the court will not compel the Depart-
ment of Revenue, which supervises statewide valuation standards,
to equalize rates.2 ' The primary responsibility for performing as-
sessment functions rests with county officers, and each county has
its own property appraiser.
2 5
B. Municipalities
Municipalities have governmental, corporate, and proprietary
powers to aid in conducting municipal government. 26 Zoning is
one of these powers. In Hillsborough Association for Retarded Cit-
izens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace,27 the supreme court deter-
mined that state agencies must seek local approval for a noncon-
forming use of municipal property, except where a specific
legislative diiective requires such a use in the particular area. Be-
cause the zoning power of municipalities derives from the constitu-
tion,2 8 the state agency could not claim sovereign immunity. 29
The local zoning authority must apply a balancing test, weighing
424. Id. at 387.
425. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see 360 So. 2d at 387 (citing Spooner v. Askew, 345
So. 2d 1055, 1059-60 (Fla. 1976)).
426. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b) provides: "Municipalities shall have governmental,
corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for munici-
pal purposes except as otherwise provided by law. Each municipal legislative body shall be
elective."
427. 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976).
428. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b), as implemented by the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act, FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3), (4) (1979).
429. But see Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975), holding that the
state is immune from a local utility tax. Justice England, who also authored Hillsborough,
asserted in Dickinson that "the principle of immunity is not constitutionally dependent."
Id. at 3 n.6. The immunity from taxation arises from compelling policy considerations for
the fiscal stability of the state and the desire for intergovernmental consistency. Id. at 4.
Only when this immunity is expressly waived may the state be taxed by its municipalities.
See note 505 and accompanying text infra.
The supreme court in Hillsborough attempted to distinguish Dickinson on the basis of
the constitutional provision in article VII, § 9(a), requiring a legislative enactment before a
municipality may levy taxes other than ad valorem taxes, as opposed to the constitutional
delegation of municipal zoning power in article VIII, § 2(b). 332 So. 2d at 612-13.
Although municipal regulation would cost the state money, the policy underlying immu-
nity from taxation is not applicable to zoning. The ability of the state to exclude itself from
rational objectives for mdnicipal land use would destroy uniformity and thwart effective
performance of regulatory functions granted to municipalities in the constitution. While en-
couraging intergovernmental cooperation and reduction of litigation, the Hillsborough deci-
sion offers the state the opportunity to maintain a nonconforming use after proving that the
public interest in its favor outweighs the interests in the zoning regulation. Id. at 612 n.3.
Furthermore, the state may exempt itself through legislation from local zoning ordinances.
Id. at 613 n.5.
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the public interests favoring the nonconforming use against those
opposing such a use. 80
The standard for judicial review of zoning decisions of the lo-
cal authority is whether the existing zoning classification is arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or confiscatory.48 1 The test is whether the rea-
sonableness of the existing classification is "fairly debatable."' I3 2 To
zone or rezone is the function not of the court, but of the local
authority." '
Another municipal power is the power to issue revenue bonds.
Municipalities may issue bonds to finance projects, if the bonds are
related to the exercise of a valid municipal purpose.4 4
Although the ultimate power to annex an unincorporated area
to a municipality resides in the legislature, municipalities may an-
nex unincorporated territory if the legislature so provides by gen-
eral or special law.4" The legislature may annex without an affirm-
ative vote of the property owners, but a referendum is required if
the municipality initiates the annexation.3 6 Property located in
another county may not be annexed without express statutory
authority.
43 7
Changing the boundaries of a municipality by annexation lies
within the autonomy granted to Dade County in the home rule
charter provision of the constitution.3 In City of Sweetwater v.
430. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d
571, 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (opinion adopted by the supreme court, 332 So. 2d at 612).
431. Broward County v. Capeletti Bros., 375 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (citing
Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)). The
Fourth District refused to find a zoning ordinance confiscatory because the property owners
were denied a reasonable use of the property in question. A zoning ordinance becomes con-
fiscatory only when "all reasonable uses are prohibited." 375 So. 2d at 315 (emphasis in
original).
432. 375 So. 2d at 316. Although the zoning board and the division of planning had
both recommended approval, the county commission denied the owner's petition for rezon-
ing. The court stated that this difference of opinion merely indicated that the issue was
"fairly debatable" and refused to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.
433. Id. See also Alachua County v. Reddick, 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979);
Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1978).
434. State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978) (includes "double-ad-
vance" refunding bonds). FLA. STAT. § 166.121 (1979) authorizes the issuance of bonds by
municipalities.
435. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2(c).
436. FLA. STAT. § 171.0413 (1979), cited in North Ridge Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. City of
Oakland Park, 374 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1979) (special law); see note 255 and accompanying
text supra.
437. McGeary v. Dade County, 342 So. 2d 549, 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); see FLA. STAT. §
171.045 (1979).
438. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 6(e) (incorporating FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11(1)(c) (1885))
provides that the electors of Dade County have the power to adopt a home rule charter
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Dade County,4 9 the city by ordinance annexed five acres of land in
the county, following the prescribed statutory method.440 The
Third District declared the attempted annexation invalid despite
compliance with the statute. Under the constitution, the method
provided in the Dade County Home Rule Charter is exclusive,"'
irrespective of state law providing a different procedure." 2
No governmental power, once provided by law, may be con-
tracted away by a municipality." 8 In City of Safety Harbor v. City
of Clearwater,"' three cities in Pinellas County entered into a ser-
vice area agreement concerning three separate unincorporated ar-
eas. Each city agreed to consider only one of the areas for estab-
lishing future municipal services and to discourage "future plans or
requests for annexation of any lands contained in the areas desig-
nated . . . for service by the other municipalities."' 445 The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, held the agreement void to the
extent that it impaired the exercise of each municipality's govern-
mental power of annexation.44' Although recognizing the desirabil-
ity of intergovernmental cooperation, the court asserted that the
elected representatives of the people and their successors must not
be limited in their governmental policies and decisions."7 In Lykes
Brothers, Inc. v. City of Plant City,448 a municipality agreed not to
annex or tax the property of a nonpublic corporation, in exchange
for the corporation's locating its plant on city-owned land. The su-
preme court held the contract ultra vires and void in the absence
of specific legislative authorization." 9
The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act 450 implements the
broad powers granted to municipalities by the constitution and at-
which "may change the boundaries of, merge, consolidate, and abolish and may provide a
method for changing boundaries of, merging, consolidating and abolishing from time to time
all municipal corporations."
439. 343 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
440. FLA. STAT. § 171.16 (repealed 1974).
441. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 6(e) (sets forth and validates the Metropolitan Dade
County Home Rule Charter).
442. 343 So. 2d at 954.
443. City of Safety Harbor v. City of Clearwater, 330 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA
1976); see Lykes Bros., Inc. v. City of Plant City, 354 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1978) (taxing
power).
444. 330 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
445. Id. at 841.
446. Id. at 842.
447. Id.
448. 354 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1978).
449. Id. at 880.
450. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(4) (1979).
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tempts to remove any limitations on the exercise of self govern-
ment other than powers expressly prohibited. On the basis of this
statute, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Tweed v.
City of Cape Canaveral,"51 receded from its holding in City of Ri-
viera Beach v. Witt,4" and held that city councils may enter into
employment contracts with persons performing governmental
functions' for a length of time extending beyond the term of the
council members.4 " The court acknowledged the possibility of
"caretaker government,"4 55 but asserted that either the legislature
could change the laws, or other remedies would control abuse. The
overriding concern of the court was the need to create job security
to help cities obtain the best people and the best performance in
government jobs. 45"
C. Consolidation and Transfer of Powers
The governments of a county and one or more municipalities
located therein may consolidate. 167 Furthermore, article VIII, sec-
tion 4 provides that:
[b]y law or by resolution of the governing bodies of each of the
governments affected, any function or power of a county, munic-
ipality or special district may be transferred to or contracted to
be performed by another county, municipality or special district,
after approval by vote of the electors of the transferor and ap-
proval by vote of the electors of the transferee, or as otherwise
provided by law.'
5
In Sarasota County v. Town of Longboat Key, " four cities
challenged a county ordinance which transferred the governmental
functions of air and water pollution control, parks and recreation,
roads and bridges, planning and zoning, and police protection from
the cities to Sarasota County. The supreme court held that such a
proposed transfer did not constitute a consolidation within the
451. 373 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
452. 286 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
453. In this case the police chief had been fired by the city council prior to the expira-
tion of his contract.
454. 373 So. 2d at 410.
455. An abusive council could create long-term contracts with several governmental em-
ployees and leave subsequent councils with no power beyond overseeing the government,
while the employees under contract continued to run the bureaucracy.
456. 373 So. 2d at 410.
457. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
458. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
459. 355 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1978).
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meaning of article VIII, section 3; this provision would apply only
if one or more of the underlying governments disappeared or was
merged into a surviving government."' 0 The court concluded, how-
ever, that article VIII, section 4 applied both to charter and to
non-charter counties, and that although broad powers are given to
charter governments in section 1(g), these powers do not override
section 4.461 The transfer of governmental powers requires compli-
ance with the specifics of that section. Municipal powers cannot be
transferred by county resolution, but must be initiated by law or
resolution of each of the governments affected. This holding allevi-
ates the concerns of the cities that municipalities could be effec-
tively abolished if a county could propose a transfer of municipal
powers to itself, subject only to countywide voter approval without
the separate approval of the voters of the municipality affected. 42
Article VIII, section 6(e) retains the special powers of self gov-
ernment given to Dade County under its home rule charter.4 s Not
only does Dade operate as a county, but where "not inconsistent
with the powers of existing municipalities or general law," 464 it may
exercise all the powers of municipalities. In Dade County v.
Nuzum,4" the county petitioned the supreme court for a writ of
mandamus to direct the appropriate state officials to pay the
county a municipal share of beverage license taxes collected in the
unincorporated areas of the county. The applicable statute4"66 pro-
vided that counties receive twenty-four percent of the revenue col-
lected within their borders and that incorporated municipalities
receive thirty-eight percent. The supreme court held that the Met-
ropolitan Dade County government is an incorporated municipal-
ity with respect to the unincorporated areas, by virtue of the home
rule charter."7
Under the home rule amendment, Dade County may not enact
an ordinance in conflict with the constitution or any general law.4 "
460. Id. at 1199-1200.
461. Id. at 1201. The constitution provides that the home rule charter of Dade County
may create a method by which any power or function of a municipal corporation may be
transferred to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §
6(e) (incorporating FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (1)(d) (1885)).
462. 355 So. 2d at 1199.
463. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (incorporating FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11 (1885)).
464. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(f).
465. 372 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1979).
466. FLA. STAT. § 561.342 (1979).
467. 372 So. 2d at 444. The court declined to require retrospective payment of the taxes
owed, but granted relief prospectively.
468. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) (incorporating FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11(5) (1885)).
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In Scavella v. Fernandez,'469 a Dade County ordinance required
that a tort claimant give written notice of his claim to the appro-
priate agency or municipality within sixty days from the date of
the alleged injury or damages, to maintain a tort suit against the
county. Section 768.28(6) of the Florida Statutes, '4 70 which waives
sovereign immunity in tort actions, specifically allows three years
for notice of the claim from the date the claim accrues. The county
argued that in order for provisions to be in conflict, compliance
with one must require violation of the other. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, nevertheless invalidated the county ordi-
nance as conflicting with general law.7
VIII. TAXATION
A. The Taxing Power
The Florida Constitution divides the power to tax among the
state, counties, school districts, municipalities, and special dis-
tricts.7 2 All forms of taxation are preempted by the state except
ad valorem taxes on real estate or tangible personal property,78
which are reserved to the political subdivisions listed above.' 7' Be-
cause of these constitutional limitations on the taxing power,
whether property is classified as real property and what body has
the power to make the classification are important questions. In
Williams v. Jones,475 the supreme court held that the legislature
has the power to classify a leasehold on real property as real rather
than intangible property. In exercising that power, the legislature
decided to enable the political subdivisions, rather than the state,
to raise revenues from the leaseholders who use the services sup-
plied at the local level.'7
The extent to which a political subdivision may tax is limited
by the millage rates set forth in article VII, section 9(b). In gen-
eral, local taxes not in excess of ten mills each may be levied for
469. 371 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
470. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1979).
471. 371 So. 2d at 536.
472. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 9.
473. Id. § 1(a).
474. Id. § 9 provides the authority for local units to tax, as well as the prohibition
against any ad valorem tax on intangible personal property. The legislature may, by general
law, permit other forms of local taxation in addition to the ad valorem tax on real and
tangible personal property.
475. 326 So. 2d 425, 431-32 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976).
476. Id. Appellants asserted that their leases were intangible personal property, subject
only to state taxation at rates lower than those imposed by the subdivision on real property.
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county, municipal, or school purposes without voter approval.
These levies may exceed ten mills only with voter approval. Mil-
lage rates for special taxing districts also require voter approval. 77
When the legislature authorized counties to create "municipal ser-
vice taxing units, 4 7 8 their formation without voter approval was
challenged in Gallant v. Stephens479 on the basis that they were
"special districts.' '480 Section 9(b) specifically permits the legisla-
ture to authorize a county to tax for municipal services that it,
rather than a municipality, supplies to unincorporated areas.
48'
The supreme court distinguished the authorization for municipal
service taxing units from that for special taxing districts.48' The
result is that a county may tax up to ten mills for county services
and, in addition, up to ten mills for municipal services without
voter approval in unincorporated areas that comprise municipal
service taxing units.' 8
These provisions of the constitution and the Florida Statutes
evidence a plan whereby the recipients of services finance only
those services they receive. The municipal service taxing units tax
unincorporated areas for services provided within area boundaries.
Similarly, municipalities that opt to have municipal services pro-
vided by the county are taxed only for the services they receive,
and not for those received by the unincorporated areas. A munici-
pality is not required to fund services of no real or substantial ben-
efit to it, but of benefit only to an unincorporated area.''
Because a municipality may not impose taxes other than ad
valorem real and tangible personal property taxes unless author-
ized by general law,4'8 administrative charges 86 made by a munici-
477. See generally Gallant v. Stephens, 358 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1978); Tucker v. Un-
derdown, 356 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1978).
478. FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01(1)(g)-(r) (1979).
479. 358 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1978).
480. Id. at 539.
481. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) provides: "A county furnishing municipal services may,
to the extent authorized by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal
purposes."
482. 358 So. 2d at 539-40.
483. In Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1978), the court held that the mu-
nicipal service taxing units may compose the entire unincorporated area of a county or only
a portion thereof.
484. See Sarasota County v. Town of Longboat Key, 353 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977), modified, 375 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1979). A municipality may be charged only for "muni-
cipal services" and then only for those municipal services which provide a real or substantial
benefit to the municipality. 353 So. 2d at 572. See also Manatee County v. Town of Long-
boat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1979); notes 404-11 and accompanying text supra.
485. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1976),
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pality may be challenged as an unauthorized form of taxation in
the guise of fees, unless the city can show that the fee is related to
the cost of administration. The amount of the fee must be related
to the cost of implementing the regulation that justifies collecting
the fee.487
B. Exemptions from Taxation
In addition to ratifying the amendment regarding supreme
court jurisdiction, 8 e the electors of Florida approved on March 11,
1980, a constitutional amendment that increases the tax exemp-
tions for homesteads4 89 under article VII, section 6, as follows:
Section 6. Homestead exemptions.-
(a) Every person who has the legal or equitable title to
real estate and maintains thereon the permanent residence of
the owner, or another legally or naturally dependent upon the
owner, shall be exempt from taxation thereon, except assess-
ments for special benefits, up to the assessed valuation of five
thousand dollars, upon establishment of right thereto in the
manner prescribed by law. The real estate may be held by legal
or equitable title, by the entireties, jointly, in common, as a con-
dominium, or indirectly by stock ownership or membership rep-
resenting the owner's or member's proprietary interest in a cor-
poration owning a fee or a leasehold initially in excess of ninety-
eight years.
(b) Not more than one exemption shall be allowed any in-
dividual or family unit or with respect to any residential unit.
No exemption shall exceed the value of the real estate assessable
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
486. Administrative charges include, for example, building permit fees and connection
fees for water and sewer service.
487. 329 So. 2d at 317-21. In this case, the fees charged were less than the costs of
connection to the existing water and sewer systems and were used to expand the systems to
meet future needs. The charges therefore did not constitute the taxation of consumers for
purposes extraneous to the authorizing regulation. The ordinances which imposed these
"impact fees," however, were defective because they did not spell out necessary restrictions
on the use of the fees collected. Id. at 321-22. The case was remanded to the trial court,
which determined that those who paid fees under protest were entitled to a refund. The
District Court of Appeals, Second District, reversed, holding that because the city had the
authority to charge the fees initially and subsequently revised the statutes to limit the use
of the funds, those who paid fees were not entitled to refunds. City of Dunedin v. Contrac-
tors & Builders Ass'n, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla.
1979).
488. See notes 70-156 and accompanying text supra.




to the owner or, in case of ownership through stock or member-
ship in a corporation, the value of the proportion which his in-
terest in the corporation bears to the assessed value of the
property.
(c) By general law and subject to conditions specified
therein, the exemption shall be increased to a total of twenty-
five thousand dollars of the assessed value of the real estate for
each school district levy. By general law and subject to condi-
tions specified therein, the exemption for all other levies may
be increased up to an amount not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars of the assessed value of the real estate if the owner has at-
tained age sixty-five or is totally and permanently disabled.
(d) By general law and subject to conditions specified
therein, the Legislature may provide to renters, who are per-
manent residents, ad valorem tax relief on school district lev-
ies. Such ad valorem tax relief shall be in the form and amount
established by general law.490
The amendment to section 6(c) mandates that the legislature
by general law increase the homestead exemption with respect to
school district levies from five thousand to twenty-five thousand
dollars. The exemption from other levies remains at the previous
five thousand dollar level specified in section 6(a), although the
legislature in its discretion may increase that amount to ten thou-
sand dollars for aged or disabled owners.
New section 6(d) authorizes the legislature to provide relief
from school district levies to resident renters. If enacted, such tax
relief could benefit lessees holding "net leases," who would other-
wise be obligated to pay the ad valorem taxes on the full assessed
value of the property if the lessor-owner did not file for the home-
stead exemption. Under the amendment, the legislature may de-
vise a mechanism whereby the lessee may apply for the exemption
directly without relying on the owner to do so.
Even though a political subdivision may have validly exercised
its taxing power, a party may nevertheless challenge the applica-
tion of the tax to him, on the ground that he is exempt. The con-
stitution exempts from taxation all municipally owned property
used exclusively for a municipal or public purpose." 1 A private
490. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6. Words in underscored italic type are additions to the
existing law.
491. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) provides:
All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or
public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. A municipality, owning property
outside the municipality, may be required by general law to make payment to
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party who leases property from a governmental body is not pre-
sumed to be serving a governmental or public purpose.02 Rather,
the use of the leased property determines whether it is exempt
from taxation. 4a When Broward County imposed a tangible per-
sonal property tax on the production company managing Parker
Playhouse, a theater leased from the city of Fort Lauderdale, the
production company claimed tax exempt status. 4  In determining
whether this particular use served a public purpose, the district
court in MacCabee Investments, Inc. v. Markham"e5 evaluated
"the primary and predominant nature and object of the function"
performed.46 The district court concluded that a facility owned by
the municipality and used primarily for legitimate theater produc-
tions and for the performing arts served a public function. The su-
preme court reversed," 7 based on its holding in Volusia County v.
Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District4" that a
business operating for a profit serves a proprietary rather than a
public function." 9
The constitution permits the legislature to enact general laws
to exempt property from taxation if it is used predominantly for
educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes.500
In 1976, the legislature passed a special law regarding leases from
the Santa Rosa Island Authority affected by the Williams v. Jones
the taxing unit in which the property is located. Such portions of property as are
used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation.
492. In Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803
(1976), lessees claimed they were exempt from ad valorem taxation because their commer-
cial establishments, located on property leased from a government body, constituted a pub-
lic purpose or function. The court rejected their claim, pointing out that these establish-
ments were primarily proprietary and profitmaking rather than governmental. Id. at 433.
493. In City of Sarasota v. Mikos, 374 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 1979), the court held that
"vacant land held by a municipality is presumed to be in use for a public purpose if it is not
actually in use for a private purpose on tax assessment day." Such vacant land is therefore
exempt from taxation under FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a), which does not by its terms require
legislative implementation and is therefore self-executing.
494. MacCabee Inv., Inc. v. Markham, 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), rev'd, 343
So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1977).
495. 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
496. Id. at 722.
497. Markham v. MacCabee Inv., Inc., 343 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1977).
498. 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804 (1977) (for lack of sub-
stantial federal question); 355 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (affirming trial court decision
that a renewed claim of exemption had already been decided by the supreme court).
499. This analysis casts doubt on the continuing validity of City of Tampa v. Walden,
323 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), which upheld an exemption for leased municipal property
operated as profitmaking concession areas within or adjacent to a public park.
500. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).
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decision,501 reducing future yearly rentals by the amount of ad
valorem taxes for county and school purposes paid during the pre-
ceding year. In Archer v. Marshall,50 2 the supreme court found
that the special law granted a tax exemption unauthorized by the
constitution, 03 and that "[i]t is fundamentally unfair for the Leg-
islature to statutorily manipulate assessment standards and crite-
ria to favor certain taxpayers over others.
'50 4
The state may claim sovereign immunity from taxation by a
political subdivision. In Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee,5 5 a city
ordinance imposed a utility tax on the state, its agencies and de-
partments, while specifically exempting the federal government
and churches.5 0 The state successfully argued that it was immune
rather than exempt from the tax, because the constitution did not
waive the immunity of the state by merely providing for possible
exemptions from taxation. An exemption presupposes a power to
tax that has been waived, whereas an immunity signifies absence of
the power. The constitution in article VII, section 9 vests munici-
palities with the taxing power, but does not by implication author-
ize taxation of the sovereign state.
50 7
C. Just Valuation
The constitution mandates that there be a "just valuation of
all property for ad valorem taxation.. ."508 The courts have inter-
preted the just valuation clause to mean that property may not be
assessed at more than one hundred percent of its fair market
value, nor may assessments be unequally or improperly determined
in relation to other properties within the same county. 0 The con-
501. See 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975); note 475 and accompanying text supra.
502. 355 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 1978).
503. Id. at 784. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Fisher, 370 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
504. 355 So. 2d at 784 (citing Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433
(Fla. 1973)). The legislature also attempted to exempt these leaseholders in additional spe-
cial acts providing for repayment to the leaseholders of an amount equal to ad valorem
taxes paid. The court found these indirect exemptions invalid in Am Fi Inv. Corp. v. Kin-
ney, 360 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1978).
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, recently held that a taxpayer has standing
to challenge the grant of an exemption without showing special injury to himself where he
asserts that the taxing or spending authority exceeded a specific limitation imposed by the
United States or Florida Constitutions. Paul v. Blake, 376 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
505. 325 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
506. Id. at 2.
507. Id. at 3-4; see note 429 supra.
508. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
509. See, e.g., Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc., 360 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1978).
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stitution does not require intercounty uniformity, and variations
between adjacent counties are not a basis for lowering tax assess-
ments.510 The mandate for just valuation derives from the consti-
tution, but the requirement for statewide uniformity derives from
a statute" ' and is a goal rather than a right. 2 This rule was point-
edly reaffirmed recently in Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc. 5
GAC owned a large tract of land on both sides of a county line.
One county assessed the property at $300 per lot; the other, at
$560 per lot. The court held that as long as the higher assessment
was properly determined in relation to other properties within the
county and did not exceed one hundred percent of the fair market
value, GAC had no cause of action for equalization of the
assessments.51"
An issue of excessive valuation arose in Department of Reve-
nue v. Morganwoods Greentree, Inc.515 The property assessor had
separately evaluated each individually owned townhouse in a de-
velopment, as well as the common areas, including, the parking and
recreational areas held in fee by Tampa Villas South, Incorpo-
rated. If the assessor, in valuing the individual units, had taken
into account the value of the common areas to each unit owner,
then the total assessment against the unit owners plus the assess-
ment against the common areas owner would have exceeded the
total value of the property because the common areas would have
been taxed twice. The court ordered a careful reassessment, ac-
cording to the following test: if parcels of property are entwined
with each other, "the total valuation of the entire project must be
just valuation, no more, no less.' 6
510. Id.; Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1976).
511. FLA. STAT. § 195.0012 (1979).
512. 345 So. 2d at 1059.
513. 360 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978).
514. Id. at 386-87.
515. 341 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1976).
516. Id. at 759. In ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Seay, 347 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1977), the
court struck down FLA. STAT. § 194.042 (1975) (repealed 1979), a legislative attempt to de-
termine the fair market value of taxable property, as a violation of the just valuation clause.
The legislative scheme enabled a landowner to contest the assessment of his property by
offering it for sale at a public auction and establishing a "fair market value" below the
assessed value. Fair market value is the price a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy
would pay a seller willing but not obliged to sell. Because the seller could forfeit his cash
deposit in this "quasi-forced" sale to the bidder and keep his property, neither buyer nor
seller met the "willing but not obliged" definition; thus, fair market value was not
established.
For a statement of the general rules of valuation, see Calder Race Course, Inc. v. Over-




The constitution authorizes but does not require the legisla-
ture to grant special tax treatment to agricultural land.517 In other
words, the constitutional provision is neither self-executing nor
mandatory, but discretionary with the legislature.518 In classifying
land as agricultural, the legislature must determine the criteria to
be used and dictate the preference the land will receive. After clas-
sification, the constitution requires that the property appraiser as-
sess the land based on statutory guidelines, including the character
or use of the land. '19 The legislature has generally chosen to clas-
sify land on the basis of use, but is not constitutionally required to
do so.
In Bass v. General Development Corp.,520 a taxpayer chal-
lenged the validity of a statute which created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that land for which the owner had recorded a subdivision
plat was not agricultural. 52 The landowner charged that there was
no rational relation between platting and refraining from using
land for commercial agricultural purposes"2 -a due process chal-
lenge. Although the legislature chose "use" as the criterion for clas-
sifying and for special tax treatment without expressly defining
that term, the courts have interpreted it as limited to actual pres-
ent use rather than intended future use.2" The court held that al-
though platting indicated a nonagricultural future use, there was
no rational relationship between platting and the present nonagri-
cultural use of land; the statute was therefore constitutionally de-
fective. Had the statute permitted the property owner to rebut the
presumption of present nonagricultural use, the statute would have
been constitutional.5 2
4
517. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(a); Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977). The
legislature could, for example, require assessment at less than one hundred percent of fair
market value.
518. 354 So. 2d at 370. The legislature has exercised that discretion through the Green-
belt Law, FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1979). Land is classified as agricultural if it has a bona fide
agricultural use. The commercial nature of the enterprise is a factor considered in determin-
ing whether land should be classified as agricultural for tax purposes, although it need not
be commercially profitable. 354 So. 2d at 370.
519. See Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
520. Id.
521. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(a)(4) (1979).
522. 374 So. 2d at 482; see note 518 supra.
523. 374 So. 2d at 483.
524. Id. at 484-85. The court also discussed an equal protection argument inherent in
the singling out of one group of property owners.
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E. Corporate Income Tax
In 1971 the constitution was amended to permit the imposi-
tion of a tax on the income of other than natural persons. 25 The
legislature implemented this provision by enacting the Florida In-
come Tax Code, 26 which imposes tax on capital gains realized
from the appreciation of property over its adjusted basis upon the
sale or disposition of that property.
In Department of Revenue v. Leadership Housing, Inc.,2 7 a
taxpayer asserted that although its property had appreciated in
value before the constitutional amendment, the appreciation could
not be taxed because it was earned before the legislature had
power to tax it. The supreme court determined that appreciation
in value is not income until it is "realized." 28 Realization is not
growth or increment in value in the capital investment, but a gain
or profit derived from the property and severed from it.52e The
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that preamendment appre-
ciation was immunized from income taxation by the earlier consti-
tutional prohibition in effect from 1924 to 1971. 530
The supreme court applied a realization analysis in S.R.G.
Corp. v. Department of Revenue581 to the question of whether in-
come realized in a year prior to the constitutional amendment, but
recognized on a taxpayer's federal income tax return after the en-
actment of the amendment and enabling legislation, is taxable. In
S.R.G., a taxpayer deferred recognition of gain on condemned
property under federal income tax laws until the sale or disposition
of the replacement property, which resulted in recognition of gain
subsequent to the enactment of state taxation of income.582 Be-
cause the statute deems income "to be created for Florida income
tax purposes at such time as said income is realized for federal
income tax purposes, '"58 the gain derived from the original prop-
525. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5(b).
526. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 71-984 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 220.01-.69 (1979)).
527. 343 So. 2d 611 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 805 (1977).
528. Id. at 614.
529. Id. This definition follows federal income tax law on realization established in Eis-
ner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Most authorities, however, cast aside the Eisner defi-
nition years ago. See, e.g., B. BrTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.70 (4th ed. 1979).
530. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (1924) provided that "[nlo tax ... upon the income of
residents or citizens of this State shall be levied by the State of Florida, or under its author-
ity .... "
531. 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978).
532. See I.R.C. § 1033.
533. FLA. STAT. § 220.02(4)(a) (1979).
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erty was realized upon condemnation, before enactment of the




In Wald v. Sarasota County Health Facilities Authority,53 5
the supreme court derived from earlier decisional law a two-prong
test for interpreting the power of governmental bodies to issue rev-
enue bonds for capital improvements to facilities named or similar
to those named in article VII, section 10(c). 5 " The test inquires,
first, whether the bonds contemplate a pledge of state or county
credit, and second, whether the project serves a paramount public
purpose.5 7 The court found that neither the state nor a county
had made a pledge of full faith and credit to the bondholders, who
were to be paid solely from hospital revenues. Hospitals, like edu-
cational facilities, serve a paramount public purpose, meeting the
second prong of the validity test. Judicial inquiry into the public
nature of the facility was unnecessary because the legislature had
determined by statute that the project was in the public interest.
The only possible ground for challenge, which plaintiff had failed
to establish, was that the legislative determination was "so clearly
wrong as to be beyond the power of the Legislature."""
2. BONDS PLEDGING CREDIT
The constitution requires approval of the electors before a lo-
cal government may borrow money to be repaid from ad valorem
534. The Florida income tax laws borrow from federal tax laws by using federal realiza-
tion concepts and by calculating "net income" for state tax purposes from "taxable income"
on the taxpayer's federal return. Although gain is included in federal taxable income only
upon recognition, the timing of which may be deferred as in S.R.G., the Florida statute and
cases treat the realization concept as a timing device. For an analysis of the realization and
recognition problems inherent in this unorthodox Florida approach, see Ullman & Zeiner,
The Realization Doctrine in Florida Corporate Income Taxation: A History and an Analy-
sis Since S.R.G., 1978 Developments in Florida Law, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1329 (1979).
535. 360 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1978).
536. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (c) creates a presumption of public purpose underlying
those capital projects named therein. See Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth.,
243 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971) (finding educational facilities permissible subjects for governmen-
tal bonds). Other proposed capital projects are not foreclosed from public revenue bond
financing if they are not named in § 10(c), but the public purpose of such a project must be
tested by standards provided in prior case decisions. Id. at 308-09.
537. 360 So. 2d at 769.
538. Id. at 770.
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tax revenues. " This requirement does not apply to pledges of
funds from other sources,4 0 even though the pledge may result in
an increase in ad valorem taxes to make up the deficiency in funds
available for operating expenses.54 1 In State v. Sarasota County,
542
a county sought validation of bonds for capital improvements lo-
cated within a special taxing district. The court noted that the for-
mation of a special district or a municipal special taxing unit did
not limit financing of improvements within the unit to taxes raised
by the unit; rather, the county could provide for payment under its
general financing authority. 8 Since the bonds pledged revenues of
the proposed water system as well as franchise fees derived from
Florida Power and Light Company, they were not bonds requiring
approval of the electors.
Although the courts ultimately decide whether a bonding mea-
sure chosen by a taxing unit to finance a capital project is proper,
only an extremely limited standard of review applies to a munici-
pality's issuance of refunding revenue bonds not payable by ad
valorem taxes. In State v. City of Sunrise,544 the city proposed a
novel method of funding by issuing "double advance refunding"
bonds.5 45 The court upheld the power of the municipality to issue
these bonds,5 46 but noted that the power had to be authorized by
the constitutional bonding limitations of article VII, section 12(b),
if the municipality were issuing bonds payable from ad valorem
taxes. In that case, the bonds would have to meet the "lower net
average interest cost" requirement.5 4 7 Since these bonds were pay-
able from sources other than ad valorem taxes, there were no con-
stitutional or statutory limitations on the power of issuance, other
than that the bonds serve a valid municipal purpose. 8
539. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 12.
540. Such sources include cigarette taxes or revenue sharing trust funds.
541. State v. Alachua County, 335 So. 2d 554, 558 (Fla. 1976).
542. 372 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1979).
543. Id. at 1117. For a discussion of limitations on municipal service taxing units, see
notes 477-84 and accompanying text supra.
544. 354 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1978).
545. With advance refunding bonds, a municipality borrows money to repay the princi-
pal and interest on bonds previously issued; with double advance refunding bonds, it bor-
rows to repay the principal and interest on advance refunding bonds. Id. at 1207-09.
546. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 and FLA. STAT. § 166.111 (1979) provide the necessary
municipal powers. 354 So. 2d at 1208.
547. 354 So. 2d at 1209.
548. Id. The "municipal purposes" requirement is also provided by the constitutional





Article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution provides that
no private property shall be taken except for a public purpose, and
with full compensation paid to each property owner. The full com-
pensation phrase has been tested in several ways. In Division of
Administration v. Grant Motor Co.,5 49 the question certified to the
district court was whether appraisers' fees and attorneys' costs in-
curred by a property owner in an administrative appeal of an an-
cillary proceeding were recoverable as part of the eminent domain
proceeding. Although limited by statute550 to costs incurred in cir-
cuit court, the complainant argued that the constitutional guaran-
tee of full payment was self-executing and, therefore, there was no
need for enabling legislation to justify an award for costs of admin-
istrative appeals. The court held that neither the constitution nor
any statute entitled the complainant to compensation for expenses
incurred in the agency appeal. Because the petitioner was seeking
to recover an intangible expense551 on the merits on his agency ap-
peal, and because the supreme court has held that the constitu-
tional guaranty of full compensation does not include intangible
expenses,"5 2 this case can be read narrowly to hold that intangible
expenses incurred in an administrative action collateral to an emi-
nent domain proceeding are not recoverable as constitutionally
mandated full compensation.
When a condemnee appeals an award, the question arises
whether "full compensation" entitles him to receive interest on the
award while the appeal is pending. Although several courts grant
interest if the appeal is successful, there is no constitutional right
to interest if the appeal if unsuccessful. The full amount of the
judgment is available to the condemnee when it is deposited in the
court after final judgment, and his election to appeal does not af-
fect his right to withdraw the money.553
The phrase "full compensation" is interpreted to mean that
the landowner must receive an actual payment representing the
549. 345 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
550. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1979).
551. The owner was seeking compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 4622(c) (1971) for pay-
ment equal to average net earnings in lieu of moving expenses.
552. Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1975). Intangibles include
items such as loss of profits. These items are not recoverable, because they are not "prop-
erty." Id. at 511. Although intangibles are not recoverable, the value of tangible property
which is either real or personal may be recovered, because the constitution does not distin-
guish between the two. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
553. Behm v. Division of Administration, 366 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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full value of his property, undiminished by any incidental
procedural expenses. If a utility company initiates a "quick tak-
ing,' '554 for example, the clerk of the court, who holds the money
placed on deposit by the utility, is authorized to exact a commis-
sion. The clerk may not take this commission from the final award
disbursed to the property owner, but must take it from the funds
remaining on deposit before their return to the utility.
565
The usual measure of damages in an eminent domain proceed-
ing is the fair market value of the property."' But if a special use
of the property enhances its value, and it is unlikely that the prop-
erty will be used differently in the future, the "value in use" con-
cept may apply. This concept recognizes that the special use of
property may make it distinct from similar property on the
market.
6 7
In Dade County v. Still,58 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, upheld the exclusion of evidence that would have affected
the jury's valuation of condemned property. In 1931, Dade County
had published an ordinance declaring an intent to take property if
street widening became necessary, but the property owner received
no compensation at that time, even though the ordinance reduced
the value of his property. In 1977, the county argued in condemna-
tion proceedings that the jury should consider the existence of the
ordinance in fixing compensation for the property. The court ex-
cluded the evidence, holding that the owner would be denied full
compensation for the reduction in value if the jury considered the
ordinance as a basis for determining "a price less than that which
would have existed without the declaration of future taking."'559
The power of government to exercise eminent domain is
grounded in the concept that the government seeks private prop-
erty for a necessary public purpose. It is the public nature of the
need coupled with the necessity for the specific piece of property
that constitutes the justification for the taking. 560 The public pur-
554. FLA. STAT. § 74.051(2) (1979) permits the utility to take immediate possession by
placing a sum of money double the value of its estimate on the worth of the property on
deposit with the clerk of the circuit court.
555. Taylor v. Tampa Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1978); see note 103 and accompa-
nying text supra.
556. Division of Administration v. West Palm Beach Garden Club, 352 So. 2d 1177
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
557. Id. at 1179-80.
558. 370 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA), afld, 377 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1979).
559. Id. at 66.
560. City of Miami v. Coconut Grove Marine Properties, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1151, 1155
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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pose is not lost because there is some private use incidental to the
public taking, such as the private operation of a concession stand
in a public park, provided the purpose of the taking is
predominently public.5"
Before there can be a taking that requires compensation, there
must be a property right in the landowner.562 The right of access to
one's land, for example, is a property right. Therefore, when the
public body has properly determined that a street should be va-
cated, the property owner may be entitled to compensation for the
resulting loss of access. To enforce payment for this loss, the land-
owner must demonstrate that he has suffered a special damage not
shared by the general public; mere inconvenience will not suffice.
Where the owner's right of access is impaired beyond mere incon-
venience, however, as when the remaining access roads to the prop-
erty are limited in some manner,"3s he may be entitled to special
damages. Generally, though, mere impairment of access, without a
taking of some part of the landowner's property, is not
compensable.
5 64
Because a governmental body need not actually enter the own-
er's land to affect his property rights, a claimant may be entitled to
compensation if he can prove that government has indirectly de-
prived him of the use and enjoyment of what is his. In Jupiter
Inlet Corp. v. Village of Tequesta,"5 a municipality drew its water
supply from a shallow water aquifer. The withdrawal of water
caused salt water intrusion into the portion of the aquifer which
lay under the property owner's land, making his portion of the aq-
uifer unusable for potable water. The district court held that the
shallow aquifer was a form of private property, the beneficial use
of which could not be divested without full compensation.8 " The
supreme court reversed the district court and set out the rules of
law to govern water rights in inverse condemnation proceedings,
focusing on the use of the land." In this case, the land was devel-
oped to its highest and best use as a condominium. The damage
suffered by the owners was merely consequential in that it did not
561. Id.
562. Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The theory of inverse
condemnation is used to force local government to pay for the lost property right.
563. The remaining road was not suitable for heavy vehicular traffic. Id. at 9.
564. See Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
565. 349 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), rev'd, 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
566. Id. at 217.
567. Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 965 (1979).
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impair the major use of the land." 8 The court analogized rights in
water to those in wild animals. Unless the party has taken posses-
sion of the water, his rights are subject to the rights of another into
whose property the water has flowed and who has begun to use the
water in a reasonable manner." 9 Had Jupiter Inlet undertaken a
project to draw out and supply the water to the condominium own-
ers prior to the municipal project, the corporation would have per-
fected its right to use the water, which would have been compensa-
ble. But this unexercised "right to use" is not a private property
right contemplated by the constitution.5 0
X. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
The Florida Constitution protects the head of a family from
creditors who want to levy against the debtor's home.171 With a few
exceptions,5" the constitution prohibits the forced sale of the
homestead under process of any court.
Although the constitution imposes some limits on how a
spouse may devise, alienate, or encumber the homestead, it does
not explicitly address the case of a partitition filed pursuant to a
divorce where the decree made no disposition of the home. In Tul-
lis v. Tullis,5"7 the ex-husband maintained possession of the home
formerly held by the spouses as tenants by the entireties. Because
both parties agreed that the property was indivisible, and the di-
vorce court had not given the right of exclusive possession to ei-
ther, the court held that the ex-spouse could obtain beneficial en-
joyment of her one-half undivided share as tenant in common
through partition.
5 7 '
568. Id. at 669-70.
569. A reasonable manner of use must involve neither negligence nor an intentional
invasion. Id. at 666-69.
570. Id. at 670. This set of facts involved competing rights to use of the property. Com-
peting rights are to be determined with reference to the Water Resources Act, FLA. STAT. §
373.012-.197 (1979).
The court also affirmed the reasoning of Thompson v. Nassau County, 343 So. 2d 965
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977), in which a cause of action for inverse condemnation was upheld where
a governmental actor changed the contours of the land so as to create a permanent overflow
of water onto neighboring land, which as a result could no longer be used for residential
purposes.
571. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
572. The exceptions include: taxes and assessments, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement, or repair of the homestead, or labor contracted for, to be performed
on the realty. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
573. 360 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1978).
574. Id. at 377. This is the narrowest reading of the holding, but the language of the
court is much broader. It appears to apply to any tenants in common if the forced sale is
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To benefit from the homestead exemption, a debtor must es-
tablish the homestead character of his property as of the time the
lien attaches.5 7 5 In Florida, a cooperative apartment, unlike a con-
dominium, 76 does not qualify as a homestead for purposes of limi-
tations on devise. In reaching this conclusion in In re Estate of
Wartels, 5 7 the court distinguished ownership of a condominium
from that of a cooperative, pointing out that a cooperative involves
ownership of shares in a corporation joined with a lease of the
premises. The significance of this distinction is that the constitu-
tion does not prevent a unit owner in a cooperative from devising
the unit to another even though he is survived by a spouse.5 7 8 The
court saw no conflict between this decision and one which permit-
ted a cooperative unit owner to take advantage of the homestead
taxation exemption,57 9 because the former was a constitutional
construction and the latter was a statutory construction.580
Although a homeowner may not devise the homestead to his
spouse if there are minor children,58' the homestead can pass to a
spouse by operation of law if the couple held their home as tenants
by the entirety.58 2 Property held by the entirety may also be
deeded from one spouse to the other if both join in the execution
of the deed.8
At least one court has engrafted an additional restriction on
the alienation of homestead property, which prevents the transfer
of such property during the holder's lifetime for less than "appro-
priate consideration." 5" The policy behind this rule is to protect
the rights of those to whom the property would pass upon the
death of the owner by assuring that the owner's estate would bene-
necessary to protect the beneficial enjoyment of the owners in common to the extent of their
interests in the property.
575. Avila S. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 605 (Fla. 1977).
576. In Avila, the court left open the possibility of the condominium being protected
from creditors as a homestead. The court dismissed the complaint based on that theory,
with leave to amend by adding a statement justifying the treatment of a condominium as a
homestead. See also Gersten v. Bessemer, 352 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), certifying to
the supreme court, as a question of great public interest, what essential factors must be
present in the pleadings to establish the homestead nature of the property when a developer
is seeking to foreclose' on property due to nonpayment on a recreational lease.
577. 357 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1978).
578. Id.
579. Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
580. FLA. STAT. § 196.041 (1979).
581. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
582. Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976).
583. Id.; Jameson v. Jameson, 369 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
584. Ostrander v. Swisher Foundation, Inc., 373 So. 2d 398, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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fit from the transfer. 85 The rule does not prevent a gratuitous
transfer in which, for example, the homestead is donated to a char-
itable organization, resulting in a tax reduction to the grantor. The
tax savings is considered a benefit to the grantor's estate, consti-
tuting "appropriate consideration" for the transfer of the
homestead. 6'
Homestead property subject to devise 587 need not be singled
out in a specific bequest, but may be included in the residuary
clause of a will.58
The constitution protects the homestead owned by the "head
of a famnily." In order for one to head a family, there must be a
family unit. In Zimmerman v. Gardner,'9 a debtor-homeowner
maintained a home for herself, for the aunt of her former husband,
and from time to time, for an adult son. The court found that the
son's occasional presence was irrelevant and that the existence of a
family unit rested on the relationship between the homeowner and
her aunt. As the homeowner had no legal obligation to provide the
aunt with a home, the relationship was terminable at will. The
court held that there was no family unit and no homestead exemp-
tion, permitting the judgment creditor to reach the home in satis-
faction of the debt.
XI. COVERTURE
The 1968 Florida Constitution abolished the distinction in
property rights between husbands and wives.5 90 Subsequently, the
supreme court ruled in Ball v. Ball5'1 that in a dissolution of mar-
riage, property held as a tenancy by the entirety will convert to a
tenancy in common by operation of law. The court declared that
the former legal presumptions of ownership based upon sex were
unnecessary and without force. The court reasoned that because
each spouse has equal property rights under the constitution, each
should share equally in the property, unless one could establish a
special equity in the property based upon his or her extraordinary
585. Id. (citing Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925)).
586. 373 So. 2d at 399.
587. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) provides that homestead property may be devised to the
owner's spouse if there are no minor children.
588. Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
589. 355 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
590. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
591. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
592. Id. at 8.
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contribution toward its acquisition. Under those circumstances, the
court may grant ownership to that party consistent with the spe-
cial equity. The special equity theory may be rebutted, however,
by a showing that the spouse raising it intended to make a gift to
the other spouse when the tenancy was established.
5
93
Despite abolishing the distinction in property rights between
sexes, the constitution provides an exception to that general rule:
the legislature may establish and regulate dower or curtesy. 94
Through this medium the legislature may provide for differing
treatment of widows and widowers, so long as the treatment rests
on some reasonable distinction having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the legislative objective. ' 5
The constitutional provision, however, does not appear to
change the common law duty of a husband to support his wife. In
Fieldhouse v. Public Health Trust,5" the trial court permitted a
direct action against a husband for the debts of his wife. On ap-
peal, the husband argued that the Married Women's Property
Act 597 was discriminatory and therefore violated the constitution.
The supreme court found the constitutional challenge without
merit, reasoning that since the statute neither created a duty in
the husband nor relieved one in the wife, it was not dis-
criminatory.598
593. Id. at 7. But see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (abolishing
application of "special equity" doctrine to marital property rights). For a discussion of the
impact of the Canakaris case, see the forthcoming casenote in 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. -
(Sept. 1980).
594. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
595. In re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1976) (disparity between economic
capabilities is a reasonable basis for distinction).
596. 374 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1979).
597. FLA. STAT. § 708.10 (1979). The Act provides that married women shall have the
same rights to own property, make contracts, and sue or be sued as unmarried women have.
It further provides that the Act shall not be construed as relieving a husband from any duty
to support his wife.
598. 374 So. 2d at 478.
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